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Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris
Nelson Robert Lund and John O. McGinnis
Abstract
Lawrence v. Texas produces a desirable policy result, but it deserves condem-
nation as a legal decision. It repudiates the Supreme Court’s most recent attempt
to put doctrinal restraints on the most anticonstitutional doctrine in constitutional
law - substantive due process. That doctrine, for which the Court has never pro-
vided a successful textual justification, has been selectively employed over the
decades to advance a variety of political agendas popular with Supreme Court
majorities. In 1938, Carolene Products put meaningful restraints on substantive
due process, taming that doctrine for about a quarter of a century. With Griswold
and Roe v. Wade, the Court adopted a new substantive due process agenda - sex-
ual freedom. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court sought to restore most of the
limits of the Carolene Products approach, while leaving the Griswold-Roe line in
place, by adopting a test requiring that newly recognized rights be deeply rooted in
the nation’s history and tradition. Lawrence repudiates the Glucksberg approach
and instead deploys an undisciplined form of judicial mysticism. Notwithstanding
the availability of plausible arguments based on precedent to invalidate the Texas
law, the Lawrence Court chose instead to rely on a series of utterly untenable ar-
guments and analytically empty bombast. We argue that the Lawrence approach
is not law in any meaningful sense of the term, but only a vehicle for judges to
impose their own political preferences on the nation. We also rebut some justi-
fications that could be offered in defense of Lawrence. We show that Professor
Robert Post’s concept of a conversation between the Court and the nation oblit-
erates the concept of law as something distinct from politics, and offers a theory
of judicial review that would justify even a decision like Plessy v. Ferguson. Sec-
ond, we show that Professor Randy Barnett fails in his effort to provide Lawrence
with a foundation in the Constitution because he misinterprets the Ninth Amend-
ment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Third, we rebut those who would
defend Lawrence on pragmatic grounds by explaining why we think competitive
federalism is a far superior mechanism for creating new norms of liberty, and for
correcting the mistakes that are inevitable in any process of policy development.
Finally, we outline the case for repudiating the Griswold-Roe-Lawrence line of
cases and for using the Glucksberg test to return the Court’s substantive due pro-
cess jurisprudence roughly to where it stood as a result of Carolene Products.
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Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris
Nelson Lund† and John O. McGinnis††
‘Alas, My Lord,
Your Wisdom is Consumed in Confidence!’1
The republic will no doubt survive the Supreme Court’s decision, in
Lawrence v. Texas,2 to invalidate laws against private, consensual sodomy,
including those limited to homosexual behavior. Such laws are almost never
enforced, and the rare prosecutions for such acts are necessarily capricious. So
the direct effect of the Court’s decision is likely to be extremely limited, and largely
salutary: a few individuals will be spared the bad luck of getting a criminal
conviction for violating laws that are manifestly out of step with prevailing sexual
mores.
Nor are we likely to see anything like the intense political opposition
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3  The Court  has  tolerated some  forms  of opposition to abortion. See, e.g., Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding statute that withheld federal funding for abortions).
Recently, however, the Court  has  exhibited a certain  impatience toward abortion opponents.
See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding statute restricting peaceful efforts
by anti-abortion activists  to persuade pregnant women not to have abortions); id. at 765
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s  holding contradicts  more than a half century  of well-
established First Amendment principles.”).
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generated by this decision’s most important doctrinal ancestor, Roe v. Wade.
Millions of Americans regard Roe as a judicial authorization for mass murder, and
understandably continue to oppose the Court’s approach to abortion.3 One can
hardly foresee a similar passion for overturning a judicial decision that merely
eliminates a few haphazard prosecutions for private conduct that has no immediate
effect on any third parties. Judging at least by what we see in the general press and
popular entertainment media, most of the public can be counted on to respond to
the immediate consequences of Lawrence with a yawn. If the Court was looking
for a case in which to flex its political muscles with impunity, it could hardly have
found a better candidate.
This does not mean that Lawrence is unimportant. Among the journalists
and academics who will largely determine the historical reputations of individual
Justices, this case will be enthusiastically celebrated, and not principally for its
small direct effects. Rather, we expect to see powerful efforts to ensure that
Lawrence paves the way for a broader attack on traditional marriage laws and
perhaps many other legal expressions of traditional morality.
We cannot join the celebration. Lawrence is a paragon of the most
anticonstitutional branch of constitutional law: substantive due process. The
decision also reflects a breakdown of the Court’s most recent attempt to put
doctrinal restraints on that intoxicating doctrine. It is a commonplace
observation—often repeated by members of the Court itself—that substantive due
process makes judges into unelected and unremovable superlegislators. History
has recorded several efforts to tame the doctrine in ways designed to give it a
more law-like nature, and thereby to protect the properly judicial function of the
Court from its all-too-human members. In Lawrence, the latest effort fell apart.
The Lawrence opinion is a tissue of sophistries embroidered with a bit of
sophomoric philosophizing. It is a serious matter when the Supreme Court
descends to the level of analysis displayed in this opinion, especially in a high-
visibility case that all but promises future adventurism unconstrained by anything
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art16
4  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
3
but the will of the judicial majority. This performance deserves to be condemned,
rather than celebrated, even by those—like us—who have no sympathy for the
statute that the Court struck down. Nor does Lawrence, which displays a
dismissive contempt for both the Constitution and the work of prior Courts,
deserve to be preserved by the doctrine of stare decisis.
Finally, we do not believe that the undisciplined approach to law
exemplified by Lawrence can be redeemed by its practical effects. The Lawrence
approach to substantive due process has relatively small and ephemeral benefits
and very large and enduring costs, particularly to the judiciary as an institution. This
is no accident. The Constitution creates alternative mechanisms for achieving
desirable legal changes that are far superior to this kind of judicial improvisation.
The ordinary political processes of democracy, and especially the operation of
competitive federalism, do not operate flawlessly or instantaneously, but they have
numerous advantages over the impatient and self-satisfied imposition of
constitutionally unjustified judicial edicts.
I.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Judges hate to enforce laws they think unjust, for the same reason that
almost everyone hates injustice that brings no personal benefits. And just as many
citizens sometimes disobey laws that they think wrong or oppressive, judges
sometimes refuse to enforce laws that offend their moral sense. This judicial
disobedience takes a variety of covert forms, but sometimes it is fairly open. And,
as with the general population, some judges are more inclined to disobey the law
than others.
A.   The Impertinent Origins of Substantive Due Process
In American law, the classic debate about the propriety of substituting
judges’ sense of justice for that of legislators can be found in an exchange of dicta
in Calder v. Bull.4 Justice Chase contended that the very nature of the social
compact implies that no legislature may “authorize manifest injustice by positive
law; or [ ] take away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the
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5  Id . at 387.
6  Id. at 399.
7  Id . at 398-99.
8  Id . at 388.
9  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810), a majority of the Court expressed strong sympathy for Chase’s position in Calder,
and perhaps even assumed a judicial power to refuse enforcement to certain  egregiously
unjust statutes. The Court, however, did not clearly so hold.
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protection whereof the government was established.”5 Justice Iredell responded
that such an approach misconceives the judicial function:
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the
ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all
that the Court could properly say . . . would be, that the
Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an
act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the
abstract principles of natural justice.6
Foreshadowing later debates, Iredell contended that American constitutions
specified the limits on legislative power, and thereby specified the grounds on
which courts might nullify statutes,7 while Chase maintained that a roving judicial
commission to correct injustice was implicit in the nature and purpose of these
constitutions, whose spirit implied additional, unstated prohibitions on the
“apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power.”8
Chase himself may have had a very modest view of the scope of his roving
commission, but that would not answer Iredell’s objection. Chase might have
responded by pointing to a specific constitutional provision that forbids injustice,
or at least forbids some general category of intolerable injustice. But there is no
such provision. The fateful step of pretending that such a provision exists was
taken six decades later in Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott.9
Taney contended in Dred Scott that the Missouri Compromise, which had
purported to outlaw slavery in the northern territories, violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. His entire analysis was comprehended in the
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10 60 U.S. at 450.
11 Id . at 624-26.
12  Id . at 446-49.
13 Id . at 627.
14  Curtis’s refutation of the particular substantive effect that Taney imputed to the
Due Process Clause did not, of course, eliminate the possibility that the Clause might have
some other substantive implications. What Curtis did  was  all that was  needed in the case
before him.
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following exclamation:
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States
of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or
brought his property into a particular Territory of the United
States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could
hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.10
In dissent, Justice Curtis explained in considerable detail why Taney had
to be wrong. The essence of Curtis’s argument was that the right to hold human
beings as property is founded entirely on positive law, and that this property right
must be lost when the owner voluntarily brings such men within a jurisdiction that
does not recognize the right.11 Taney himself acknowledged that Congress had the
authority to legislate for the territories,12 and the slave states themselves recognized
their own right to forbid the importation of slaves, notwithstanding the due process
clauses in their own state constitutions.13 The Due Process Clause, whose lineage
traced to Magna Charta and which had an analogue in the law of every American
state, had never been thought to have any bearing on the right of legislatures to
regulate or abolish slavery. Taney gave no reason for suddenly imputing any such
substantive effect to the Clause, which would among other things imply that the
Fifth Amendment silently withdrew from Congress its unquestioned power to
regulate or ban the slave trade.14
Dred Scott proved to be a pretty good paradigm for the future
development of what we call substantive due process. Offering no reason at all to
explain how the due process provision of the Constitution could suddenly operate
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
15  For a comprehensive discussion of the impossibility of reconciling substantive
due process with the text of the Constitution, see John Harrison, Substantive Due Process
and the Constitutional Text, 83 Va. L. Rev. 493 (1997).
16  75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
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to invalidate a type of law that was well-established at the time the provision was
enacted, Taney must simply have believed that his political and moral judgments
were superior to that of the benighted legislature. Neither he nor anyone since has
produced any evidence that the Due Process Clause contained some kind of
secret message telling judges that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property except when judges find the deprivation sufficiently inoffensive to their
moral and political sensibilities. In response to Curtis’s well-reasoned legal
arguments, Taney responded with dead silence. And what else should one expect,
if he neither had nor needed arguments or evidence? Self-evident truths about the
justice of the slaveholders’ position apparently struck Taney as quite an adequate
substitute.
Even if one assumes that lawless judges will always be with us, one might
think that the upshot of Taney’s judicial adventurism should have been to make
substantive due process an anathema forever. That did not happen, perhaps
because every age offers an opportunity for adventurism that seems, at least for
the moment, more respectable than Taney’s. Whatever the cause, due process has
continued to provide a textual thunderbolt that Olympian judges can be hurl at any
law that offends them. Neither the Court nor any of its members has even once so
much as attempted to explain how any of this can be derived from or even
reconciled with the text of the Due Process Clauses. Over and over again,
objections to the factitious nature of substantive due process have been answered
with the same stony silence that Taney displayed toward Curtis.15
After the war, the Court revived substantive due process, and then
promptly and emphatically reinterred it. In Hepburn v. Griswold,16 the Court
invalidated a federal statute making paper money legal tender. Although the
opinion focused largely on the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court also
invoked the Due Process Clause and Chase’s “manifest injustice is
unconstitutional” theory. The Court’s analysis of the Fifth Amendment was
Taneyesque in its simplicity and emptiness: “It is quite clear, that whatever may be
the operation of [a statute that directly diminished the value of existing contracts],
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art16
17  Id . at 624.
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19  79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
20  Id . at 552.
21  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
22  “[I]t  is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision that we have
ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of
Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers  of New Orleans be held  to be a
deprivation of property within the meaning of [the Due Process Clause].” Id . at 80-81. 
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due process of law makes no part of it.”17 Justice Miller’s dissent echoed Iredell’s
objections to Chase in Calder, and quite understandably responded to the Court’s
statement about due process by saying that “[t]he argument is too vague for my
perception.”18
The very next year, Hepburn was overruled in Knox v. Lee.19 Rather like
Miller in Hepburn and Curtis in Dred Scott, the Knox Court found the due
process position adopted in Hepburn hard to take seriously. After noting that the
currency had often been debased without anyone suspecting that due process was
somehow involved, the Court said of the challenged statute: “Admit it was a
hardship, but it is not every hardship that is unjust, much less that is
unconstitutional; and certainly it would be an anomaly for us to hold an act of
Congress invalid merely because we might think its provisions harsh and unjust.”20
B.   Substantive Due Process Returns to Respectability
That should have been the end of substantive due process. In a subsequent
series of cases, however, it gradually came back to life. The crucial step was
probably the 5-4 decision in the Slaughter-House Cases.21 Writing for the Court,
Justice Miller casually dismissed a due process objection to a local butchers’
monopoly,22 which two of the dissenters would have sustained on the basis of what
by that time was the usual unexplained invocation of due process. What is most
important about the case, however, is that the Court gave the principal substantive
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment—the Privileges or Immunities
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
23  For more detailed expositions of this interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, see Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 96-101 (Field, J., dissenting);  David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 342-51 (1985); John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385 (1992).
24  See 83 U.S. at 79. As Justice Field pointed out in dissent, the majority rendered
the Privileges  or Immunities  Clause a “vain  and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing”
because the states never had the power to abridge such rights. Id . at 96. It should therefore
be no surprise that the majority’s  conclusion rested on a flawed reading of the text, according
to which the phrase “privileges  or immunities of citizens of the United States” was recast to
mean “privileges  or immunities  of citizenship of the United States.”  See Harrison, supra  note
x, 101 Yale L.J. at 1414-15.
25  The Equal Protection Clause, as its wording implies, was probably only meant to
require governments to protect all groups equally  from having their rights violated by other
private persons. A  prominent illustration of the need for this provision was the tolerance of
some governments for the activities  of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court’s  decision to expand
equal protection doctrine to reach additional forms of discrimination would  not have been
necessary if Slaughter-House had not misinterpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
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Clause—such a narrow interpretation that it was effectively drained of significant
effect. The main purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, we believe, was
to forbid the states from adopting discriminatory legislation, for which the
notorious Black Codes were the paradigm, that created favored and disfavored
classes of state citizens with respect to the basic civil rights the states all recognized
in one form or another.23 In other words, the same equality of rights that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV had always demanded between a
state’s citizens and citizens of other states was now supposed to hold among
different classes of a state’s own citizens as well. The majority’s decision to
confine the reach of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to rights specifically
derived from national citizenship, such as the right to travel to the national capital
in order to assert a claim against the national government, was a huge and
intolerable blunder.24
Eventually, the Court settled on the Equal Protection Clause as the primary
textual hook for restoring what Slaughter-House had improperly subtracted from
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.25 In the early years after Slaughter-House,
however, a minority of the Court also made efforts to bend the Due Process
Clause into a general tool for banning statutes found to be oppressive, or
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art16
26  See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 140-42 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (due
process provision secures  to every  individual the essential conditions for the pursuit of
happiness and should  never be narrowly construed). Field freely acknowledged that the
police power of the states  permitted legislatures to regulate the use of property and liberty
so as  to prevent injuries  to others, id. at 145-46, and the majority confined itself to
concluding that the challenged statute was justified by the public interest, id. at 126.
27  E.g., Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1874) (upholding liquor
prohibition);  Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (upholding prohibition of
voting by women);  Munn  (upholding state regulation of rates  charged by grain-storage
elevators).
28  96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878).
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unjustified by the public good.26 After several cases in which the Court rejected
due process challenges to various state regulations,27 Justice Miller’s majority
opinion in Davidson v. New Orleans announced with exasperation that the Due
Process Clause was not a roving commission for courts to correct what they
believed were policy errors by legislatures:
There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange
misconception of the scope of this [due process] provision as
found in the fourteenth amendment. In fact, it would seem, from
the character of many of the cases before us . . . that the clause
under consideration is looked upon as a means of bringing to the
test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every
unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the justice of the decision
against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a
decision may be founded.28
While declining to provide a comprehensive explication of the clause (along the
lines of the unfortunately comprehensive explication of privileges or immunities in
his majority opinion in Slaughter-House), Miller focused on procedural nature
of due process:
[I]t is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process
of law, been deprived of his property, when, as regards the issues
affecting it, he has, by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court
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case law between discriminatory  legislation, to which equal protection analysis was applied,
and legislation challenged because it violated a fundamental personal right, to which due
process analysis  was  applied, see David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised:
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of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to
such a case.29
 Thus, Davidson at a minimum expressed a clear desire to put sharp limits
on the use of the Due Process Clause. Unfortunately, the Court soon adopted a
much broader conception of the limits placed on state legislation, according to
which the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the regulation of private liberty and
property beyond whatever a majority of Justices might consider within the
traditional or proper scope of the “police power.”30 The ensuing “Lochner era”
was marked by disagreements over the appropriate scope of the police power,
over the degree of deference owed to legislative judgments, and over the
application of the police-power test to particular cases.31 But all Justices agreed
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art16
Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, Georgetown  L.J.
(forthcoming).
32  198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33  Cf. id. at 63 (“This interference on the part  of the legislatures  of the several states
with the ordinary trades and occupations of the people seems to be on the increase.”).
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in principle—despite the absence of any textual argument for doing so—that the
Due Process Clause puts real substantive restraints on legislative power.
Lochner itself illustrates the unanimity among the Justices on this point.
While Justices Peckham and Harlan disagreed over the narrow question of
whether the statute limiting the hours that bakers could work was a bona fide
health regulation, and thus within the traditional scope of the police power, Justice
Holmes advocated a much more deferential form of review. But even Holmes
expressly acknowledged that he would find a violation of the Due Process Clause
if “a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of
our people and our law.”32
How different is Holmes’s position from that of Peckham and Harlan?
Contrary to the conventional view, we think the difference is relatively small.
Tradition alone cannot provide a workable standard, as Holmes himself clearly
recognized by emphasizing that due process protected only “fundamental
principles.” Without that qualification, reliance on tradition could become
“conservative” in the worst sense of the term, for it would invalidate legislation on
no other ground than its novelty, thereby preventing legislatures from responding
appropriately to new circumstances. Lochner itself exemplifies this problem. All
the Justices appeared to agree that the legislature was perfectly free to regulate the
hours of bakers in order to protect their health, but the majority assumed it would
be unconstitutional to regulate their hours in order to protect their unions, or
otherwise to enhance their bargaining power vis à vis their employers. Protection
of the bakers’ health is every bit as paternalistic as the other purposes, and the
effect on the bakers’ liberty of contract is identical. The relative novelty of what the
legislature was trying to accomplish appears to have been its fatal flaw,33 and no
legal doctrine that made mere novelty the test of a statute’s unconstitutionality
could survive. As Holmes pointedly noted, in terms reminiscent of Iredell, Curtis,
and Miller: “[T]he accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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36  6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
37 Correctly interpreted, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause would  have required state governments  to avoid certain  kinds of class discrimination
when making these adjustments. See supra  notes and text accompanying footnotes xx. 
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novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.”34
Holmes attempted to take account of this by insisting on protecting only
the “fundamental” principles of our tradition. But how does one distinguish
fundamental traditions from nonfundamental traditions? Holmes never explained
how he could tell the difference between a statute that he merely found “shocking”
and a case in which “a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the
statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.” Thus, Holmes did no
better than the majority in fashioning a test that would make substantive due
process a coherent rule of law.
The Lochner era has come to symbolize the practice of judges
illegitimately legislating from the bench. That view did not arise because there is
something particularly weird or implausible about regarding traditional property
rights or the right to contract as fundamental elements of our legal tradition. They
almost certainly were regarded as such by a consensus of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, which framed the Fourteenth Amendment.35 And that position obviously
has even deeper roots in our legal tradition, as one can easily see in Justice
Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.36 But legislatures have always been
adjusting the substantive contours of these rights, and must continue to do so.37
The real difficulty, which the Lochner-era Court never faced up to, was the need
to articulate some principled basis, having some connection to the Constitution, for
distinguishing constitutionally tolerable legislative adjustments from those which are
beyond the pale. Well into the Lochner era, for example, the Supreme Court
upheld novel regulations that were not much easier than the statute in Lochner to
justify as measures reasonably designed to protect the public health, morals, or
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art16
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general welfare.38 The occasional decision to invalidate a statute looked more like
a random strike of lightning than like any kind of principled jurisprudence.39
C.   Prometheus Bound?
Eventually, the Court took two steps that had radical consequences. First,
it began, without much explanation, to expand the list of “fundamental” rights to
include a potpourri of privileges traditionally thought important to a life of
bourgeois happiness, including the right to raise a family, to worship God, and to
better oneself through work and education.40 Next, after some important personnel
changes, it began to lose its enthusiasm for protecting the core economic rights
summed up by liberty of contract and the protection of property rights. Eventually,
this process of expanding the periphery and abandoning the core of substantive
due process culminated in Carolene Products.41 We think this opinion is best
understood as an effort by the Court to tame the doctrine of substantive due
process by confining it within narrow boundaries.
The Carolene Products reformulation had two steps. First, the Court
began by imposing a virtually conclusive presumption of constitutionality under due
process on “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions.”42
Unlike Holmes’s largely rhetorical expression of deference to legislatures in
Lochner, Carolene Products adopted a formulation with real bite, for it placed
on the challenger of such a regulation the burden of proving the nonexistence of
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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“any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords
support for [the regulation].”43 Not surprisingly, given that the Court has continued
to take this test seriously in the realm of commercial regulation, every such
regulation has survived the Court’s review, and substantive due process has
effectively been abolished in this area.
The second step was Footnote 4's outline of circumstances in which this
ferociously strong presumption might be relaxed, or even reversed. Three
somewhat overlapping and now well-known categories were identified: (1)
challenges to laws that on their face fall within a specific constitutional prohibition,
including the Bill of Rights guarantees “incorporated” into the Fourteenth
Amendment by substantive due process; (2) challenges to laws that distort the
political process by creating obstacles to the repeal of undesirable legislation; and
(3) challenges to laws disadvantaging “discrete and insular minorities.”
The Court’s explanation of the meaning of this framework consisted largely
of citations offered as illustrative precedents, and those citations are extremely
interesting and significant. With two exceptions, all of the citations were to
decisions enforcing Bill of Rights protections against the states, or to equal
protection decisions. The exceptions were Meyer v. Nebraska44 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,45 two substantive due process decisions involving parental
decisions about their children’s education. These two decisions do not fit into any
of the three categories set out in Footnote 4. The Court obscured this fact by
mischaracterizing both cases as category (3) “discrete and insular minority”
cases, which in effect transformed them into equal protection decisions. Thus, the
effect of Footnote 4 was to suggest that substantive due process should effectively
be limited to “incorporating” specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, an exercise
in which the text of the Constitution actually provides significant guidance and
judicial discretion is not inherently unbounded.
Perhaps even more important, limiting substantive due process in this way
tended to align the combination of substantive due process and equal protection
pretty closely with a plausible understanding of what the Privileges or Immunities
Clause was meant to accomplish. Whatever uncertainty there is about the exact
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meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, nobody has ever seriously
denied that it was meant at the very least to provide constitutional authorization for
the abolition of the Black Codes and analogous forms of caste legislation. That is
essentially what category (3)—the core of modern equal protection
doctrine—accomplishes. All of the due process cases cited to illustrate categories
(1) and (2) are, or can easily be understood as, “incorporation” decisions tied to
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. Although there is less reason for certainty
here than with respect to caste legislation, there is at least some evidence that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was also meant to render much of the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states.46
We think that Footnote 4, by stressing due process “incorporation” and
otherwise focusing Fourteenth Amendment review on equal protection, was as
close as the Court had ever come to creating a disciplined framework for the
development of substantive due process. Substantive due process would consist
almost entirely of applying Bill of Rights provisions to the states, an exercise in
which the constitutional text imposes at least some minimal constraints on
interpretive willfulness. Outside that area, equal protection doctrine, which has a
real connection to the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, would tend
to displace substantive due process.47
For about a quarter of a century, the Court followed Footnote 4 pretty
faithfully, and with significant results. The selective incorporation of Bill of Rights
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provisions, and the concomitant explosion of opportunities to address new
interpretive questions about the meaning of those provisions, generated a great
deal of interesting legal doctrine with real effects on the life of the nation. And
equal protection, of course, generated a tremendous amount of significant new
doctrine concerning racial discrimination and other matters. By the end of that
fairly short period of time, however, the Court decided that all of this was still not
enough.
D.   Prometheus Unbound
By the mid-1960s, something exciting was happening in the world. The
Pill! The Sexual Revolution! The Beatles! This was really big, and the Justices
were quick to get into the game. Fittingly enough, the Court’s most exuberant
member48 wrote the initial opinion, in Griswold v. Connecticut.49 In a series of
flourishes that were free-spirited even by the standards set in previous substantive
due process opinions, Justice Douglas concocted a general “right of privacy” that
was held to protect the right of married couples to use contraceptives.
The best argument for invalidating the prohibition against contraceptive use
by married couples would have relied on the Meyer50 and Pierce51cases from the
Lochner era. In Meyer, the Court struck down a statute forbidding schoolteachers
to instruct their students in any modern language other than English until after the
eighth grade. The Meyer opinion was short and conclusory, but it clearly rested
on a general right “to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,” including the asserted
rights “to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children.”52 Pierce invoked Meyer for the proposition that the Constitution forbids
a regulation that “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
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to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”53 One might
have read these cases to stand for the general proposition that heightened scrutiny
or a presumption of unconstitutionality attaches to any statute that intrudes into
traditional family life, and then argued that the public purpose rationales advanced
in defense of the education laws in Pierce and Meyer were more obviously
plausible than Connecticut’s claim that it was seeking to prevent extramarital
sexual relationships.
One obstacle to this approach was that Carolene Products’ Footnote 4
had already interpreted Meyer and Pierce very differently, namely as equal
protection cases involving the oppression of national and religious minorities,
respectively. This had no basis in either opinion, and it was dicta, so the Griswold
Court might simply have corrected it. A faithful reading of Meyer and Pierce,
however, might have implied a wholesale revival of economic rights—anathema
to Douglas and other New Dealers—because these cases relied upon and
reaffirmed that core doctrine, even while extrapolating from it to include a broader
range of privileges.54 Unwilling to replace Carolene Products’ misinterpretation
of Meyer and Pierce with a plausible interpretation, the Court invented a new
misinterpretation, claiming that Meyer and Pierce were First Amendment cases.55
This claim had no more support in either opinion than Footnote 4's
misrepresentation of Meyer and Pierce as “discrete and insular minority” cases.
Griswold moved these cases from Footnote 4's category (3) to category (1), but
to what end? Nobody could plausibly have argued that the right to contraceptives
is guaranteed by the First Amendment.56
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Rev. 1893, 1939-40, 1948 n.212 (2004).
57  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (given Griswold, a ban on distributing
contraceptives  to unmarried persons appears to violate substantive due process, but
certainly violates equal protection).
58  The Griswold-Roe line cannot accurately  be described as  protecting a right to
medical treatment or access to medical devices. Griswold’s only  reference to medicine came
in its statement of the issue presented, where it noted that the case involved “the intimate
relation of a husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.” 381
U.S. at 482. Intervening decisions also relied on a privacy right without mentioning rights
connected to medicine. See, e.g., Eisenstadt. Roe itself expressly  relied on the right to privacy
created in Griswold. Roe did  observe that abortions may be necessary  to avoid  medical
harms, but it did not impose any requirement that medical harm be imminent, and it expressly
held that a woman may abort a pregnancy to avoid a “distressing life.” 410 U.S. at 153.
18
This odd move turned out to be only the precursor to one of the most
famously outlandish arguments in all of constitutional law. After discussing several
other specific protections for specific forms of privacy in the Bill of Rights, the
Court asserted that “emanations” from these specific provisions of the Constitution
created “penumbras” and ultimately a penumbral “zone of privacy” in which the
right of married couples to use contraceptives was simply declared to exist. But
this is plain sophistry, since the use of contraceptives has nothing at all to do with
any of the specific protections in the Bill of Rights. Apart from the obvious
expressio unius problem, one could as logically have said that since the Bill of
Rights protects some acts, it therefore protects all acts, and every governmental
regulation of any act is presumptively unconstitutional.
The Griswold opinion concludes with a rhapsody to the sacred and noble
institution of marriage. This was apparently meant no more seriously than the
phony interpretations of Meyer and Pierce, or the sophistical emanations theory,
for the Court soon jettisoned this traditionalist baggage, announcing a right of
unmarried persons to contraceptives.57 In Roe v. Wade, the Court then used the
newly minted right of privacy to invalidate statutes restricting abortion. The right
of privacy at the core of all these cases is better described as a right of sexual
autonomy because that is the only context in which the Court applied the privacy
theory.58 With the expansion of this right in Roe (and subsequent decisions giving
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children a right to contraception and abortion without their parents’ consent59),
the Court completely severed substantive due process from all of its remaining ties
to anything like a set of fundamental rights that could be found in the American
legal tradition.
Substantive due process had ceased to serve as a brake on innovative
legislatures (as it once had done in the area of economic liberties) or as a tool for
preventing deviations from consensus judgments that could plausibly be thought to
be reflected in specific provisions of the Constitution (as in most of the due process
cases falling under the rubric of Footnote 4). Substantive due process now put the
Court in the vanguard of social change. This was liberation jurisprudence.
E.   Prometheus Rebound?
Since protection of sexual autonomy is the principle uniting the Griswold-
Roe line, it came as a discordant note when the Court refused to apply this
principle to homosexuals in Bowers v. Hardwick. If sexual freedom is a right so
fundamental that it justifies a practice that millions of people regard at least as a
serious evil, and millions of others regard as murder,60 how could the Constitution
possibly fail to protect mere sexual contact between consenting adults?
In Bowers, the Court declined to answer this obvious question. Instead,
it simply revived without explanation the pre-Roe idea that substantive due process
protects only those liberties “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”61
As a matter of legal reasoning, this was wholly unsatisfactory, for that standard had
already cracked when the Court repudiated the Lochner-era cases protecting
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economic liberties that in fact had deep roots in our history and tradition. And the
deeply rooted tradition standard had been entirely obliterated by Roe. The Bowers
decision can only be explained by hostility to substantive due process itself,62 by
disapproval of homosexuals or their practices,63 and/or by a concern that it would
be imprudent to add fuel to the ongoing political fire that Roe had notoriously
ignited.64
Whatever the immediate motivation, Bowers might have signaled a new
policy of leaving existing due process precedents in place, while refusing to extend
the logic of those precedents into new areas of application. Justice White’s
majority opinion itself suggested just such an approach,65 and that policy seemed
to be at work in Casey in 1992, where the Court purported to preserve the
factitious right to abortion primarily for reasons of stare decisis, even while it
shaved a little from the edges of the right created by Roe v. Wade and its
progeny.66
In Washington v. Glucksberg,67 this inclination to go and sin no more
seemed to harden into a firm resolution. After the Bowers decision, Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dept. of Health had acknowledged a Lochner-era precedent
recognizing Fourteenth Amendment protection of the common law right to refuse
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unwanted medical treatment.68 Rejecting the argument that this right plus the right
to abortion implied an additional right to assisted suicide, the Court read its
precedents to require the identification of a fundamental right “objectively, ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,’”69 as well as a “‘careful description’
of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”70 By that strict standard, laws against
assisted suicide easily passed muster because they have long existed, are still very
widespread, and have in many cases been recently reaffirmed by express
legislative action.
Glucksberg seemed to promise an end to the outright judicial
improvisation reflected in the Griswold-Roe approach to substantive due process.
Whatever we have done in the past, the Court seemed to say, we will now treat
proposed extensions of the privacy doctrine in much the same way that we have
treated claims on behalf of economic liberties since the end of the Lochner era:
without categorically rejecting such extensions, we will apply a test that effectively
incorporates a near conclusive presumption of constitutionality.
The promise of Glucksberg might have been kept. But “freezing”
substantive due process as it then stood, or more precisely radically slowing its
expansion, would have been quite a challenge. The differences between
Glucksberg and Carolene Products help to illustrate the problem. First, in 1938,
the Court openly repudiated the bulk of prior substantive due process doctrine,
leaving little past precedent with the generative force to compete with the new
paradigm. Yet it simultaneously provided a role for the Court to develop new
areas of jurisprudence that could make a real difference in American life. Finally,
Footnote 4 had aligned the doctrine more closely with the written Constitution than
it previously had been. This was a potentially stabilizing program with which
Justices having a wide array of jurisprudential inclinations might feel comfortable.
But these features were missing from Glucksberg. The opinion repudiated no prior
decision, and it did not point to any area in which substantive due process could
open significant new opportunities for judicial creativity. Nor did it explain how its
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approach, which left the Griswold-Roe line intact, would move the law back
toward the written Constitution.
We think that “freezing” substantive due process would be a more tenable
strategy if it meant returning to something like the Footnote 4 approach. In our
view, the Griswold-Roe line of decisions was and is an insuperable obstacle to any
lasting restraint on substantive due process. As long as that line of cases stands,
it will be difficult for anyone to pretend, and impossible for anyone to believe, that
this doctrine represents something other than judicial policymaking. Neither the
holding in Bowers nor the analytical approach of Glucksberg can be reconciled
in any truly principled fashion with Griswold and its progeny. The Court may
choose to continue on the path marked by the Griswold line, and adopt any
number of new national policies liberating individuals from legal restraints on their
private behavior. But the Court also has the choice of repudiating this line of
decisions outright. The better alternative—one that remains open even after
Lawrence—would be to return the law roughly to where it had once been guided
by Carolene Products.
II.   THE LAWRENCE OPINION
It would have been easy to write a plausible-sounding legal opinion
invalidating the Texas sodomy statute. Justice O’Connor sketched one obvious
way to do that in her Lawrence concurrence. She would have used equal
protection rather than due process, and her approach would have applied only to
statutes treating homosexual sodomy differently than heterosexual sodomy. The
essence of her analysis consisted in extending the reach of two earlier equal
protection decisions. In Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court
invalidated a law that sought to withhold food stamps from households that
included unrelated individuals, apparently on the ground that the law was
motivated by moral disapproval of “hippie communes.”71 More recently, in Romer
v. Evans, the Court used equal protection to invalidate a state constitutional
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provision that sought to prevent the enactment of special legal protections for
homosexuals, while permitting such protections for other groups.72 It is a fairly
small step in logic—though perhaps one with extraordinary consequences—to
conclude, as O’Connor does in Lawrence, that “[m]oral disapproval of
[homosexuals], like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient
to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”73 Without
taking a position on the question whether the Texas statute should have been held
to violate equal protection, we can at least see an argument from Moreno and
Romer to the conclusion that equal protection is violated when the law proscribes
sodomy in private among homosexuals while permitting identical conduct among
heterosexuals.74
Alternatively, the Court might have concluded that the right of privacy
created by the Griswold-Roe line of cases implies a right of consenting adults to
engage privately in whatever sort of sexual contact they like. Contraception and
abortion are obviously not ends in themselves, and these decisions, whatever else
they may also do, all operate to abolish laws that create obstacles to sexual
activity. Furthermore, as we discussed above, the right to homosexual conduct
seems to follow a fortiori from the right to abortion, because sodomy, unlike
abortion, cannot be thought to result in any immediate and direct harm to third
parties. An opinion confirming that the “right of privacy” decisions are at their core
about the right to sexual freedom would hardly have stated more than what has
been obvious for many years. Bowers, which purported to limit the Griswold-Roe
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line of cases to matters of “family, marriage, or procreation,”75 could have been
overruled on the ground that it was inconsistent with their underlying rationale.76
We would have disagreed with a decision based on this argument because
we think Griswold and Roe are such erroneous glosses on the Constitution that
they should be repudiated rather than extended. But at least we could have
understood what the Court was doing in standard legal terms. Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court, by way of sharp contrast, simply abandons legal analysis.
Freed from the chains even of rational argument, the Lawrence Court issued an
ukase wrapped up in oracular riddles.
A.   The Court’s Ascent into More Transcendent Dimensions
The Lawrence opinion begins with six sweeping sentences:
[1] Liberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. [2]
In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. [3] And
there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the
home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. [4]
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. [5] Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. [6] The instant case
involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more
transcendent dimensions.77
This stirring introduction may leave some readers eager to rush on in hopes of
finding out more about these transcendent dimensions. Unfortunately, if one pauses
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to ask just exactly what this passage means, one finds oneself rather more
bewildered than enlightened. Some of the more obvious difficulties include the
following:
• Unless one supposes that liberty is a divinity like Nike or Eros, the
reification or personification of liberty in sentence [1] accomplishes nothing
except to dodge the obligation to say what exactly it is that protects
against the (unspecified) unwarranted intrusions.
• Sentence [2] is similarly high flown, and empty. Does saying that the State
“is not omnipresent in the home” mean that the State dwells in some rooms
of the house but not others? What would that mean, exactly? And if that
is not what the sentence means, what does it mean?
• Sentence [3] suggests that the author may believe (incorrectly) that
“omnipresent” means “being a dominant presence,” though it’s hard to be
sure about much of anything here. Are our lives and our existence two
different things? Who claims that the State should be a “dominant
presence” in every sphere of our lives, and what is the point of denying
such a far-fetched claim?
• Sentence [4] creates more mysteries. Is freedom different from liberty?
How exactly does freedom extend beyond spatial bounds? By spreading
through space despite some kind of physical obstacles? By spreading
beyond space itself into some other dimension? What dimension would
that be? Maybe the sentence just means that freedom can entail more than
an absence of physical obstacles to physical movement. But who has ever
denied such an obvious proposition?
• In sentence [5], we finally seem to get the main point of the paragraph,
which is apparently a claim that there should be limits on governmental
intrusions on “freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.” But that is not what the sentence says. Instead, we have
“liberty” presuming an “autonomy” that includes certain forms of
“freedom.” Does that mean that liberty and freedom are different things,
and that both of them are different from autonomy? What would the
differences be? As to “an autonomy of self,” is this just a pointless
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redundancy, or are we meant to contrast autonomy of self with an
autonomy of something other than self? What might such a thing be?
• With respect to sentence [6], we will confine ourselves to noting first, that
while “transcendent dimensions” has a splendiferous ring to it, the term has
no obvious determinate meaning at all in this context; and second, that this
difficulty is aggravated by the author’s assumption that there are degrees
of transcendence among these dimensions.
When the United States Supreme Court opens an opinion with a pronouncement
whose meaning can only be guessed at, one may be tempted to pass on with a
chuckle or an embarrassed sigh. But Justice Kennedy has made that hard to do,
for Lawrence repeats a similar flight of rhetoric from the opinion he coauthored
in the Casey abortion case:
These matters [i.e. marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education], involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.78
The problems here resemble those we noted in connection with Lawrence’s
opening passage. What exactly would be involved, for example, in defining one’s
own concept of existence, meaning, etc.? We suppose that Americans have a right
to define words however they wish, especially if they do not care to communicate
with other people. But how would one define one’s own “concept” of these
things? Maybe by adopting an opinion—such as that the material universe is
expanding or that practicing sodomy will help solve the mystery of human
life—that others might not share? People do that all the time, without the Supreme
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Court’s assistance. In any event, whatever this “heart of liberty” might be, what
does it have to do with the last sentence in the quotation? If the State could find
a way to compel an individual to believe one thing or another about such matters
as existence or the universe, we are told that the beliefs could not “define the
attributes of personhood.” Does this mean that the attributes would be determined
in some other way? Or that personhood would then have no attributes? Or that the
person would have no personhood? What is personhood, anyway, and how does
it differ from its attributes?
We do not know the answers to questions such as these, and we strongly
suspect that Justice Kennedy does not know either. There are three legal, rather
than mystical, propositions that the Court might be groping for in this passage, and
we agree with them all: (1) Supreme Court precedents protect the freedom to
make certain choices about matters relating to sex; (2) people are free to think
whatever they want to think about existence, meaning, the universe, and the
mystery of human life; and (3) the First Amendment sharply limits the power of
government to attempt to compel beliefs about these matters. But what could
propositions (2) and (3) possibly have to do with the legality of governmental
restrictions on abortion or sodomy? Aborting a pregnancy is not a thought or a
belief, nor is an act of sodomy.
Perhaps the Court has ascended to one of those “more transcendent
dimensions” referred to in Lawrence’s opening passage, and perhaps such
distinctions as that between beliefs and acts have been transcended in that
dimension. Unfortunately, there are indications that something like this may well
have occurred. Lawrence utterly demolishes all those aspects of substantive due
process doctrine through which previous Courts had sought to give it an intelligible
and law-like character. In Lawrence, as we shall see, nothing is left except
bombast and the naked preferences of Supreme Court majorities.
B.   Transcending Prior Doctrine
As an initial matter, Lawrence does not bother even to say what standard
of review it is purporting to apply. Since Carolene Products, the most important
threshold question in substantive due process cases has been whether they involve
a fundamental right. If such a right is found, the Court demands a strong
justification for infringing it, and gives little or no deference to legislative judgments;
if no fundamental right has been infringed, rational basis review applies, and the
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79  Justice Scalia concludes that the majority must be employing rational basis
review because it never identifies a fundamental right. We think that Scalia may be too
generous. It is true that language suggestive of rational basis review does make an
appearance in the majority opinion: “Texas furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify  its  intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.” 123 S. Ct. at 2484. But
language suggestive of the fundamental rights  approach also makes  an appearance: “Liberty
presumes  an autonomy  of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial
and more transcendent dimensions.” Id . at 2475. In any event, the majority’s  failure to specify
a fundamental right does not imply the use of rational basis  review unless one assumes  that
the Court must have been faithful to the traditional categories of review.
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legislature will receive almost unquestioning deference. Lawrence refuses to make
express use of these categories, leaving its standard of review indeterminate.79
Even more significantly, the Court neither analyzes the interests of the
government, as heightened scrutiny would require, nor makes any effort to imagine
what legitimate purpose the statute might serve, as rational basis review would
require. Nor, as we shall see, does the Court supply any alternative rational
analysis, legal or otherwise. Inflated and empty pronouncements about more
transcendent dimensions and defining one’s own concept of meaning do not
constitute rational analysis. And without such analysis, we have not been told more
than what the Court wants and that it has the power to do what it wants.
Another striking manifestation of Lawrence’s haughtiness toward the kind
of legal analysis that had become conventional in the case law is its treatment of
Glucksberg, which had articulated, just six years earlier, the governing test for
expansions of substantive due process protection. Without so much as citing
Glucksberg, Lawrence abandons both of its core requirements: that a
fundamental right be carefully described and that there be objective evidence that
the right is deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition. The rejection of the
Glucksberg test is not only unacknowledged and unexplained, but it is a total
rejection.
We can see how complete the rejection is by examining Lawrence’s
purportedly legal explanation for its decision to overrule Bowers. As we suggested
earlier, the Court could have tried to articulate a logically coherent argument based
on existing case law, for Bowers is difficult or impossible to reconcile with the
Griswold-Roe line of cases. But that is not the basis on which Lawrence overrules
Bowers. The Court comes closest to making a legal argument when it contends
that the deeply rooted tradition of proscribing sodomy, on which Bowers had
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80  123 S. Ct. at 2478 (emphasis  added). See also  id. at 2479 (early American sodomy
laws were not directed at homosexuals “as such”). We assume, arguendo, that the Court’s
statements  about the history of sodomy laws are accurate. One scholar, however, has
checked the laws in five colonies, and discovered that three of them had laws specifically
t a r g e t e d  a t  h o m o s e x u a l  s o d o m y .  S e e
http://www.claytoncramer.com/primary.html#SodomyLaws  [last visited April 27, 2004].
81  Id . at 2480. Actually, Bowers only stated, quite indisputably, that proscriptions
against homosexual sodomy  have “ancient roots,”  and it pointed out a number of undisputed
facts  about the state of the law at several points in American history. See 478 U.S. at 192-94.
82  Furthermore, it is no more than a sign of good sense that the states have
generally  not engaged in the kind of espionage needed to uncover evidence of private sexual
conduct, and such governmental self-restraint does  not in any way imply the recognition of
a right to engage in conduct that the law itself has frequently proscribed.
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relied, did not support the holding in that case because sodomy laws traditionally
applied to heterosexual conduct as well as homosexual conduct: “[T]here is no
longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a
distinct matter.”80 By the Lawrence Court’s logic, the traditional proscription
against prostitution must be quite compatible with a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual prostitution, or heterosexual prostitution for that matter, since the law
has generally not singled out either of them “as a distinct matter.” That is absurd.
Let us assume, furthermore, that Lawrence is right to claim that Bowers
overstated what the Court calls its “historical premises” about anti-sodomy laws.81
Even if this were true, it would be no more than a red herring. The Court’s
perfectly plausible claim that the states have not aggressively and consistently
punished homosexual conduct does not advance one whit the argument that a
right to homosexual sex specifically, or nonprocreative sex in general, is deeply
rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. The absence of consistent
condemnation does not imply the existence of consistent protection. If it did, there
would be deeply rooted traditional rights to incest, prostitution, bestiality, cocaine,
gambling, child labor, animal cruelty, and thousands of other practices that have
been tolerated at some times but not others.82
The Court’s next attack on Bowers involves a play on words. Whereas
almost all previous substantive due process decisions had expressly or implicitly
claimed that there was a deeply rooted legal tradition of protecting the conduct at
issue in the case, Lawrence appeals instead to what it calls an “emerging
awareness” that it finds reflected in “our laws and traditions in the past half
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83  123 S. Ct. at 2480.
84 Id. at 2480-81.
85  See Bowers, 478 U.S. at192-93. Moving to even more recent times—the period
after Bowers—the Lawrence Court  observes  that only  a quarter of the states still have laws
against sodomy, and that only four of those are directed only at homosexuals. 123 S. Ct. at
2481. This  development is irrelevant to Lawrence’s claim that Bowers was “was not correct
when it was  decided.” Id . at 2484. Nor does this development show that a right to this form
of sexual conduct is deeply rooted in our nation’s history or tradition. It  merely shows that
state governments  are perfectly  capable  of changing their policies  to reflect the views  of their
citizens even after the Supreme Court  has  announced, as  it did  in  Bowers , that the
Constitution does not require them to do so.
86  We, of course, do not suggest that foreign and international decisions have no
role to play in constitutional law. Constitutional law sometimes  requires  investigation of facts
about the world, such as  whether one consequence inevitably  follows from another. Foreign
law can sometimes  provide empirical evidence about such regularities. Moreover, concepts
in the United States Constitution such as executive power were drawn from British law and
thus the original meaning of the Constitution may reflect such foreign understandings. Our
objection is to using contemporary foreign law as a gloss on the meaning of constitutional
provisions or traditions of the United States.
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century.”83 This turns the meaning of a deeply rooted legal tradition of protection
upside down. But even within this new upside down world, the Court fails to
establish any such new tradition. It is true, as the majority observes, that in 1955
a private group of reformers (the ALI) failed to recommend criminal penalties for
sexual relations committed in private, thus proposing that the laws of every state
in the union be changed.84 And it is also true that some states subsequently
changed their laws. Whatever the merits of the ALI’s recommendation, however,
or the motivation behind it, half the states still had laws against sodomy thirty years
later when Bowers was decided.85 A “tradition” that half the states had never
adopted is a spoof.
C.   Transcending America
In yet another significant attack on the core meaning of a deeply rooted
tradition and on any meaningful limits on judicial discretion, Lawrence appeals to
foreign legal decisions.86 The Court notes portentously that prior to Bowers, the
European Court of Justice held that laws proscribing homosexual conduct were
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87  123 S. Ct. at 2483.
88  The Court may be headed in this  direction, not only  in substantive due process,
but in other areas  as  well. See J. Harvie  Wilkinson III,  International Law and American
Constitutionalism 12 (copy on file with authors) (wondering what principle  judges can use
to decide which foreign decisions to cite). 
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invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights. This citation might be
an appropriate response to someone who made the silly claim that homosexual
conduct has never been tolerated in Western civilization. Contrary to suggestions
in Lawrence, however, neither the majority opinion in Bowers nor Chief Justice
Burger’s concurrence made any such claim. And if even if they had, it would have
been irrelevant dicta in a case that required the identification of a fundamental right
in our Nation’s history and tradition.
Unfortunately, Lawrence’s invocation of the European Court of Justice
cannot easily be dismissed as a gratuitous refutation of a claim that Bowers never
made. Later in Lawrence, the Court points out that the European Court has
followed its own precedent rather than overruling its precedent in order to follow
Bowers. What a surprise! But what does this shocker have to do with the issue in
Lawrence?
The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has
been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or
urgent.87
Can the Court really be implying, as its language suggests, that the decisions of
foreign courts have more authority than decisions of American legislatures or even
prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court itself? Probably not. More
likely, the Lawrence Court simply felt free to pick and choose from decisions
around the world the ones that it likes, to use them as justification or at least
decoration for its own ruling, and to ignore decisions that are contrary. It is hard
to think of a more ad hoc and manipulable basis for interpreting the United States
Constitution, and the use of foreign decisions to bolster substantive due process
claims is yet another example of the way Lawrence maximizes and reflects the
Court’s now completely undisciplined discretion.88
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9 0   T h e  e s s a y s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://www.playboy.com/worldofplayboy/hmh/philosophy/. For a more concise summary  of
the Philosophy—including the claim that “sex in a  very real way is the most civilizing force
o n  t h i s  p l a n e t ” — s e e  a  r e c e n t  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  H e f n e r  a t
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-13/hefner1.html.
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D.   Exploring More Transcendent Dimensions
 The arguments just discussed, as weak as they are and destabilizing of law
as they may turn out to be, are not as corrosive and illogical as the core arguments
of Lawrence. Consider, for example, the Court’s most fundamental attack on
Bowers. The real mistake in that case, according to Lawrence, was to ask
whether the sexual conduct proscribed by the statute was protected by the
Constitution: “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse.”89 This is a transparent debater’s trick. If a
married couple challenged a statute forbidding them to have sexual intercourse, a
court could obviously decide whether they had a right to do so without implying
that marriage is about nothing other than the exercise of that right. Indeed, courts
commonly make decisions about married people’s rights to control their property
and their children without implying that marriage is “simply” about property or
“simply” about the care of children.
This bizarre reformulation of the issue in Bowers is part of a broader move
that alters the whole nature of substantive due process. What was once a relatively
coherent—albeit mistaken—effort by the Court to protect certain fundamental
rights from legislative interference has now become a tool through which the Court
can simply impose on the nation its own visions of human freedom, the meaning of
the universe, and the mystery of human life. While it would be foolhardy to make
any confident predictions about what decisions will eventually emerge from these
visions, Lawrence pretty strongly suggests that the Court has concluded that
unregulated sexual activity is at the very least central to The Meaning of Human
Liberty. This resembles nothing so much as the Playboy Philosophy articulated by
Hugh Hefner during the 1960's in a long, ambitious series of essays in Playboy
magazine.90
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91  123 S. Ct. at 2482. 
92  Id.
93  Id.
94  There are, of course, many kinds of behavior that adults have a right to engage
in, but which the government treats  disrespectfully and seeks to discourage. Familiar
examples  include smoking, making racist comments, gluttony, and desecrating the American
flag.
95  123 S. Ct. at 2482 (emphasis added).
33
This inference is strengthened by the Court’s rejection of the course
proposed in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence—to strike down a statute targeted
exclusively at homosexuals on the basis of equal protection analysis. The
Lawrence majority itself calls her argument “tenable.”91 Why then reach out to
invalidate all statutes proscribing sodomy, including those that do not discriminate
against homosexuals? One possible answer might have been that general
proscriptions against sodomy have a disparate impact on homosexuals. Whatever
the merits of that suggestion, it is not the Court’s answer. Instead, the Court
declares that a failure to examine the “substantive” validity of the Texas statute
would somehow allow that statute’s “stigma” to remain.92 Or, in another
formulation, a failure to overrule Bowers would “demean” the lives of homosexuals
and invite some kind of discrimination against them.93 The Court does not
elaborate on the meaning of these cryptic statements, but it appears that Lawrence
may have created a constitutional right, not just to engage in sodomy, but to enjoy
the government’s respect for engaging in sodomy.94 That might explain why it
seemed so imperative to overrule Bowers, which at the very least evinced no
admiration for homosexual sodomy or for those who engage in it. And it is the
most obvious way to explain the Court’s reference to “the due process right to
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty.”95
If this is what Lawrence means, it may presage a new jurisprudence in
which governments are forbidden from doing anything that might convey
disapproval of any sexual practices that the Court believes are somehow
connected with efforts “to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of
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96  Id . at 2481.
97  Whatever the merits of Hugh Hefner’s views as a matter of social policy or
philosophy, a question that we do not address here, we think that the constitutionalization
of such views  by the Supreme Court  could  hardly  be regarded as an insignificant
development.
98  The Court twice goes out of its way to leave open the possibility that homosexual
relationships may be entitled to formal recognition in the law. Id . at 2478, 2484. We should
note that invoking Lawrence in support of a claimed right to same-sex marriages would not
imply that “marriage is simply about the right to have sex[ ].” See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at
2478; supra  notes xx and accompanying text. Rather, it would  simply recognize  that a central
purpose of marriage has  always been to define legitimate sexual relations, and that laws
denying this  form of legitimation to homosexual relationships may foster the kind of “stigma”
and “discrimination” that Lawrence condemns. See id. at 2482. But for an argument that the
Lawrence Court  eschewed equal protection analysis because it feared it would then be
committed to legalizing same-sex marriage, see Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, Stanford
Working Paper No. 85 (2004) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=512662). 
99  See id. at 2478. In the quoted passage, the Court may seem to discourage this
inference through a cryptic  suggestion that government may prevent “abuse of an institution
the law protects,” but no examples of such abuse are provided.
100  Id . at 2481. The Court expressly leaves open the question whether laws
proscribing prostitution can survive due process review. Id . at 2484. A sensible legislature
might well conclude that prostitution or adultery  has  more substantial effects  on third  parties
than sodomy  does, and that this  justifies  different treatment under the law. But such analysis
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the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”96 In light of the Court’s apparent
enthusiasm about the spiritual or mystical nature of sexual activity, this could mean
that something resembling the Playboy Philosophy will become the official doctrine
of the United States.97 It certainly points toward the abolition of all laws denying
any of the benefits of marriage, including the dignitary benefits associated with the
term “marriage,” to homosexual couples.98 And it probably also points toward the
abolition of all laws that try to “define the meaning of the relationship or to set its
boundaries,” as for example by limiting the number of people who can
simultaneously be married to one another or by defining adultery as a violation of
the marital relationship.99 And it is hard to see why laws against prostitution should
survive, since this may be the only sexual outlet through which some people wish
to, or even can, exercise “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”100
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does not appear to be part of the Lawrence enterprise, for the Court’s opinion fails even to
examine the justifications offered in defense of the Texas sodomy statute. The focus in
Lawrence is instead on the contribution of sex to defining the meaning of life, and it is not
at all obvious how a court could conclude that sodomy contributes more to this
constitutionally significant function than prostitution or adultery.
101  “The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.” Id . at 2484. This  statement
comes  shortly  after the Court  expressly  approves  Justice Stevens’ claim in his  Bowers
dissent that prior cases had established that “the fact that the governing majority in a State
has  traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” Id. at 2483.
102  Some may object that health and safety laws are justified because society is
required to incur costs in  caring for those who injure themselves  through reckless behavior.
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It is also possible, given the Lawrence Court’s habitually sloppy use of
language, that its proclamation of a “right to demand respect for [protected sexual]
conduct” is just an unsuccessful attempt to say that the Constitution demands that
a right to engage in this conduct be respected to the extent of not being
criminalized. Under that interpretation, the passages in Lawrence that seem to
celebrate nonprocreative sex might be dismissed as so much self-indulgent fluff. 
This interpretation, however, may entail radical consequences as well.
Nowhere in the Lawrence opinion does the Court so much as entertain the
possibility that state legislatures could have any valid reason for proscribing
sodomy in general or homosexual sodomy in particular. Furthermore, the Court
comes very close to implying that one obvious basis for such proscriptions—a
desire to discourage behavior considered immoral by the majority—is inherently
illegitimate.101 Even if we leave aside other possible rationales for the statute, such
as public health and promoting the institution of marriage, how is the desire to
discourage putatively immoral behavior really different in any way marked out by
the Constitution from the paternalistic desire to discourage other forms of
putatively dangerous or self-destructive behavior? When the government outlaws
conduct that it regards as risky or unhealthy—such as the recreational use of
drugs, or working long hours in a bakery, or driving a motorcycle without a
helmet—it is making a moral decision that assigns a higher value to health and
physical safety than to the spiritual insights that some people have said they get
from LSD, or the moral satisfaction that some people get from following a strict
work ethic, or the mystical exhilaration of flirting with danger on the open road.102
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Whatever the validity of this  justification, a legislature  could  rationally  conclude that society
incurs  costs  of vario us kinds when its  citizens adopt lifestyles  in which sodomy  plays a
significant role. Texas and several amici had articulated a number of relevant state interests
that could be advanced by the Texas statute, including public  health, protecting traditional
morality, and promoting the institution of marriage. Lawrence simply ignores  these interests,
as though it were beneath the Court’s  dignity to discuss them, and the Court certainly did
not require  those challenging the statute to prove the non-existence of “any state of facts
either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support  for” the Texas  statute.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 154.
103  123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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Unless the Court were to distinguish without any constitutional justification
between the different moral judgments reflected in different forms of paternalistic
legislation, it is hard to see how any regulatory statute could survive unless it is
demonstrably necessary to prevent immediate injuries to people other than those
who want to engage in the conduct.
We certainly do not believe that the Lawrence Court consciously decided
to embrace any such radically libertarian interpretation of the Due Process
Clauses. Nor do we assume that the apparent sympathy for the more limited
Playboy Philosophy actually reflects a conscious adoption of Hugh Hefner’s views
by all the Justices who joined the majority opinion. In fact, we think that the most
salient characteristic of Lawrence is the impossibility of determining what it means,
other than that five Justices have decided to forbid laws proscribing sodomy.
Whatever new rights the Court may find or refuse to find among “the components
of liberty in its manifold possibilities,”103 Lawrence will stand primarily for the
proposition that due process jurisprudence has transcended the bounds of rational
discourse.
III.   CAN LAWRENCE BE DEFENDED?
Our claim that Lawrence’s version of substantive due process is a travesty
may be met with two basic objections. One is that our understanding of
constitutional law is not sufficiently sophisticated. The other response is the
opposite, namely that Lawrence correctly interprets the text of the Constitution.
Substantial articles defending Lawrence on these disparate grounds have already
appeared. Both are fine examples of their kind, and worth examining in some
detail. 
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104  See Robert  Pos t ,  Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution:  Culture,
Courts and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 96 (2003). 
105  Id. at 106. 
106  Id. at 105-106. 
107  Id . at 105.
108  It might be thought the Post is merely making a noncontroversial positive point,
namely  that constitutional law is whatever the Supreme Court can get away with saying that
it is. But this does  not appear to be the case. Post affirmatively recommends that the Court
should  “conceive of constitutional law as  a consequence of a relationship  of trust that it
seeks  continuously  to establish with the American people.” Id . at 107. For Post,
constitutional law is  legitimated by the degree to which the Court  retains “the warranted
confidence of the American people,”  id., though he never explains how warranted confidence
could be distinguished from unwarranted confidence.
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A.   Lawrence as Sophisticated Law
Writing in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Robert Post celebrates
the principal features of Lawrence to which we object. He agrees that Lawrence
“shatters” Glucksberg’s attempt to cabin substantive due process,104 and reflects
changing moral views within the elite culture.105 He agrees that its holding lacks
clear contours and that its effects depend on the future resolution of its multiple
ambiguities, such as whether it applies only to private conduct or extends to public
recognition of homosexual relationships.106 For Post these are not deficiencies, but
admirable aspects of an opinion that tests the waters and gives the Court the
option of retreating from its position if the public becomes “inflamed by the
decision.”107
Far from treating Lawrence as an affront, as we do, Post suggests that
complaints like ours merely reveal an unsophisticated understanding of the nature
of constitutional law. According to Post, constitutional law is always a product of
“constitutional culture.” The Court will participate in the creation of that culture by
holding a “conversation” with the American people, who will either show
confidence in the Court’s decisions or repudiate them.108 But Post’s defense of
Lawrence actually confirms our point because, as we will show, he is forced to
hollow out the meaning of constitutional law itself and to misrepresent what it
means to have a “conversation.”
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109  Post’s defense of Lawrence can usefully  be compared with John Hart  Ely’s
defense of the Warren Court revolution. Ely argued that Warren Court jurisprudence made
sense because special efforts by the judiciary are needed to enforce a coherent and
overarching principle—reinforcement of democracy—whic h can be derived from the
constitutional text taken as a  whole. Democracy and Distrust (1980). Whatever the merits of
Ely’s argument, he at least attempted to reconcile the Court’s decisions with the text of the
Constitution. Post does not.
110  Post, supra  note x, at 82.
111  This is the branch of substantive due process that has rendered equal protection
doctrine applicable  to the federal government. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1945) (implicitly); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (explicitly).
112  Post also tries to distinguish his conception of constitutional law from raw
politics  by asserting that the Court “must endow [the doctrine of substantive due process]
with attributes of administrability, consistency, stability and so forth.”  Post, supra  note x,
at 107. This list provides very  weak criteria—so weak that many political processes could
satisfy them. In  any event, by Post’s own account, the history of substantive due process
has  been inconsistent and unstable, and he never explains how Lawrence could  possibly  be
seen as  contributing to any increased consistency or stability. Indeed, by celebrating the
opinion’s ambiguity, Post seems to admit that it does not.
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The radical nature of Post’s position is somewhat obscured by his effort
to portray his favored approach as a moderate alternative to excessively formal
and excessively political approaches to constitutional law.109 He concedes that the
text should be controlling when it is clear, as for example in its requirement that
each state have two Senators.110 But how is the text any less clear about
“substantive due process”? Whatever the exact meaning of the Due Process
Clauses may be, the Court has never so much as attempted to derive this doctrine
from the text, as we have already discussed. Inserting provisions into the
Constitution is no less a violation of the text than taking provisions out. Why,
moreover, would it be any worse for the Court to eliminate the uneven
apportionment in the U.S. Senate than it was to make this change in the state
senates? Reynolds v. Sims plus “reverse incorporation”111 could easily yield the
conclusion that our “constitutional culture” has rendered the applicable provisions
of Article I and Article V obsolete. If the Court drew that conclusion, and still
retained the confidence of the American people, it is difficult to see why Post
should object.112
Post obscures his approval of the Court’s exercise of raw political power
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113  Id. at 104. 
114  Alternatively, they can try  to elect Presidents and Senators who will try to fill
vacancies on the Court with judges  likely to overrule  Lawrence. To put it mildly, this is a
unreliable strategy.
115  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
116  Id . at 866-69 (majority opinion); 871 (plurality opinion).
117  Post, supra  note x, at 84.
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by calling Lawrence “the opening bid in a conversation the Court expects to hold
with the American public.”113 This conversation is a fiction. The Lawrence Court
did not try to persuade the people in states with anti-sodomy laws to change their
statutes, and indeed did not even discuss the reasons they may have had for
enacting such statutes. Nor can the people of these states respond to the Court by
reenacting their statutes. This is a “conversation” in which the Court issues
commands, and those who disagree must obey. Nor can the “American public”
have any effect on Lawrence by “conversing.” Instead, they must secure the votes
of two-thirds of each house of Congress and majorities in three-fourths of the state
legislatures.114 Thus, we can translate Post’s conversation metaphor as follows:
when the Court speaks, the American public is effectively silenced so long as the
Court secures the agreement of the very small number of people required to block
a constitutional amendment.
 Lest this be thought to give too little credit to the Court’s willingness to
listen to those who disagree with its decisions, consider Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.115 If ever a sizable number of people became “inflamed” by a modern
Supreme Court decision it was in the wake of Roe v. Wade. In Casey, however,
the Court contended that the inflamed public response to Roe was a powerful
reason to reaffirm the right to abortion, even for Justices who doubted that Roe
had been correctly decided.116 This makes the dialogue between the Court and the
public a pretty one sided conversation.
 Post also never shows why the Constitution cannot or should not be read
to leave the Court without a roving commission to invalidate laws that it really
dislikes. Although he claims that judicial neutrality is a “chimerical objective,”117 he
never shows why Lawrence’s form of substantive due process is compelling, let
alone inevitable. Instead, he simply begins with the brute fact that the Court has
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
118 Id . at 85.
119 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961).
120  Post, supra  note x, at 106 n.494 (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, Constitutional
Equality as a Cultural Form:  The Courts and the Meanings of Sex and Gender, 38 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 513, 548 (2003)).
121  See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and The Desegregation Decisions , 81
Va. L. Rev. 1881 (1995). Professor McConnell shows  that proponents  of the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 acknowledged that the Act would  require  that public  accommodations, including
common schools, be available  to all without regard to race. Id. at 990-97. Because the only
source available  for authorizing tha t act was  the Fourteenth Amendment, and because
proponents  expressly  relied upon this  constitutional provision, id. at 990-91, these assertions
constitute an interpretation by members of Congress that the Fourteenth Amendment
rendered segregated public schools unconstitutional. That interpretation in turn  provides
good evidence of the original understanding of the Amendment because it came  so soon
after ratification and because support  for that interpretation was  widespread. See id. at 1101-
1105.
40
adopted the doctrine of substantive due process.118 That observation, however,
does not establish that the Court had to do so. Moreover, by beginning his
discussion of substantive due process with Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v.
Ullman,119 Post ignores long stretches of history in which the Court was able to
interpret the Constitution without embracing substantive due process, and even
longer stretches of history in which the Court avoided anything like Lawrence’s
free form version of the doctrine. A world without substantive due process is not
only possible, it has actually existed.
In defending the imposition of the Court’s cultural judgments and elite
values, Post plays the usual trump card:  Brown v. Board of Education, which
he assumes was nothing more than the imposition of elite cultural values.120
Contrary to Post’s assumption, the unconstitutionality of segregated public schools
can plausibly be derived from the text and history of the Fourteenth
Amendment,121 so Brown does not trump our objections to his theory of
“constitutional culture” after all.
Even more damaging to Post’s position, however, is that it lends itself very
well to a defense of Plessy v. Ferguson. Like Lawrence today, Plessy and its
progeny reflected much elite opinion of the time—not only in the South but in the
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122  See, e.g , Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:  Indians, Aliens,
Territories and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 260 (2002) (Plessy consistent with much of elite opinion). 
123  Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution:  Lawrence v.
Texas, 2002-2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21. 
124  Id . at 40.
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North, not only in conservative but also in quite progressive circles.122 With the
help of Professor Post’s metaphor, we can now see that Plessy’s embrace of the
separate but equal doctrine was the Court’s bid to start a conversation with the
American public on the subject of race. The American public never did become
so “inflamed” as to repudiate Plessy by adopting a constitutional amendment, and
the Court apparently retained the trust and confidence of the public throughout the
many long decades of judicially sanctioned Jim Crow. If Post wants to defend
Brown and Lawrence because they successfully imposed elite opinion on a
reluctant nation, he should find it even easier to defend Plessy’s embrace of elite
judgments that were less reluctantly accepted by the nation.
Post’s jurisprudence of constitutional culture is a jurisprudence of extreme
constitutional relativism. No longer does the Constitution represent a set of rules
and constraints that the American people have imposed on themselves through
formal action outside the context of ordinary politics. Instead, it represents the
restraints of the moment that an unapologetically elitist Court wants to impose on
the people—good until it wants to impose some other set of restraints. We cannot
agree that this is a more sophisticated view of constitutional law than our more
traditional approach. Rather, we think it represents the repudiation of law as a
concept distinct from politics.
B.   Lawrence as Textual Interpretation
Taking a tack that seems at first to be the opposite of Post’s, Professor
Randy Barnett contends that Lawrence articulates a text-based theory of
constitutional liberty.123 We do not believe that Barnett succeeds in showing how
Justice Kennedy’s “elegant ruling”124 provides either a definable rule of decision
for future cases or a plausible interpretation of the constitutional text. And, as a
positive matter, the Lawrence opinion is much less likely to be a step toward the
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principled libertarian revolution that Barnett favors than toward a habit of imposing
judicial whims and fads, whatever they happen to be.
First, Barnett approvingly notes that Lawrence abandons the requirement
that an asserted right be deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition.
According to Barnett, this is appropriate because liberty itself is deeply rooted in
the nation’s traditions.125 Thus, Lawrence properly adopted a “presumption of
liberty” that requires the government to demonstrate that any behavior it seeks to
prevent is not an exercise of liberty but of “license.” License, in turn, is defined by
Barnett as violating the rights of others,126 thus producing what he claims is a
coherent theory that can readily be applied as law.
This defense of Lawrence is unsatisfactory. The distinction between liberty
and license is wholly dependent on an unstated conception of what “the rights of
others” are and what it means to infringe them. A list of the “rights of others”
certainly cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution, and they are by no means
self-evident. Political philosophers have engaged for centuries in sharp and
unsettled debates about the appropriate line between liberty and license, and
American history contains any number of competing strands of argument on this
question. Barnett adopts a view drawn from classical liberalism and contemporary
libertarian theory. We are personally sympathetic to that approach, and we are
willing to assume that a Supreme Court staffed with nine Randy Barnetts might
well produce an intellectually coherent and in many ways salutary set of social
policies. But we cannot claim that our policy views are self-evidently embodied in
the Constitution, while others, such as President Franklin Roosevelt’s notion of the
four freedoms, are self-evidently unconstitutional.127 Indeed, even the classical
liberal tradition encompasses sharp debates about what constitutes a harm to third
parties that is sufficient to justify curtailing liberty. “Liberty” is exactly like “justice”
in this respect:
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128  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell. J.).
129  Barnett, supra  note x, at 40:
In addition, federal power is  further constrained by the rights retained by
the people—both those few that are enumerated and, as  affirmed in the
Ninth Amendment, those liberty rights that are unenumerated as well. At
the state level, the Privileges  and Immunities  Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states such as  Texas  from infringing the privileges
or immunities of its U.S. citizens. These include both the liberty rights  or
“immunities” retained by the people, and the positive rights or
“privileges” created by the Constitution of the United States.
This  passage appears  to argue for the incorporation of the Ninth Amendment. Professor
Barnett defines  the Ninth Amendment as protecting “those liberty rights that are
unenumerated as well.” Id. Two sentences later he then defines  immunities in the Privileges
and Immunities Clause by reference to “liberty rights  . . . retained by the people.” Id . The
phras e “rights  retained by the people” is, of course, from the Ninth Amendment, so it is
natural to read this reference to “liberty rights” as  a reference back to the protections of the
Ninth Amendment whose unenumerated “liberty rights” Professor Barnett just mentioned.
Earlier in this  essay, moreover, Professor Barnett responded to complaints that the
Constitution does not protect unenumerated rights by noting:
Whenever a  particular liberty is  specified, therefore, it is  always subject to
the easy rejoinder: “Just where  in the Constitution does it say that?” And
that rejoinder is offered notwithstanding the plain language of the Ninth
Amendment: “The enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” With that background
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[T]he ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject;
and all that the Court could properly say . . . would be, that the
Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an
act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with
[certain] abstract principles.128
Barnett not only wants to claim that Lawrence provides a coherent legal
test, he also wants to root the source of that test in the text of the Constitution.
Unfortunately, his textual argument is quite untenable. Barnett suggests that all of
the rights protected in the Ninth Amendment against the federal government are
also protected against the states by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.129
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in mind, we are now in a position to appreciate the potentially
revolutionary significance of the decision in Lawrence v. Texas.”
Id. at 32.
Professor Barnett’s recent book also appears to confirm that he believes  the Ninth
Amendment applies  to state as  well as  federal laws. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost
Constitution 232-233 (2004) (approving of the use of Ninth Amendment to strike  down  state
as  well as  federal laws). Indeed, he entitles one chapter: “The Mandate of the Ninth
Amendment: Why Footnote 4 Is  Wrong.”  Id. at 224. Footnote 4, of course, has applied to
both state and federal law.
130 Cf. Leslie Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 Va. L. Rev. 627
(1956).
131  See Kurt Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment (I): The Lost Original
Meaning  (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=505482); Kurt Lash, The Lost History of the
N i n t h  A m e n d m e n t  ( I I ) :  T h e  L o s t  J u r i s p r u d e n c e  ( a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://ssrn.com/abstract=505484).
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The Ninth Amendment by its terms is a rule of construction rather than a
substantive guarantee of rights.130 It simply warns against misinterpreting the
Constitution to mean that the enumeration of certain rights might authorize the
federal government to infringe other rights. It is thus a reminder that the people
retain all their rights against the federal government—including the right to govern
themselves as they see fit within their own states—except to the extent that the
federal government is authorized to infringe those rights in the exercise of its
enumerated powers. We think that the meaning of the Ninth Amendment is
perfectly plain on its face, but our understanding of its meaning has now been
confirmed with overwhelming historical evidence by Professor Kurt Lash.131
If the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the state governments to infringe
any right that the Ninth Amendment forbids the federal government to infringe, it
would follow that the state governments may only exercise the same enumerated
powers that the Constitution confers on the federal government. But that
conclusion is absurd. To see why Barnett’s argument is vulnerable to this reductio
ad absurdum refutation, it is important to understand the function of the Ninth
Amendment, which is a complement to the Tenth Amendment. Just as the Tenth
Amendment affirms that the enumeration of powers in the Constitution is
exhaustive, so the Ninth Amendment affirms that the enumeration of rights in the
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132  See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty:  The
Ninth Amendment’s Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & Pol. 63, 65 (1987).
133  Id . It might be objected that our reading of the Ninth Amendment makes  the
Tenth Amendment superfluous because our view implies that the Ninth Amendment, like the
Tenth, just means that the federal government possesses  only the powers  enumerated in the
Constitution. This objection is not well founded. First, there is no rule that forbids the
Constitution from having superfluous provisions. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions
on the Opinions Clause, 82 Va. L. Rev. 647, 648 (1996) (“Even a casual look at the
Constitution reveals  clauses  that are in some  sense redundant or superfluous.”). Second, any
such “superfluity” objection would  have to apply  to the accepted interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment as  well because that provision simply confirms and emphasizes what was
already plain, namely that the federal government has  only those powers delegated to it by
the Constitution.
134  See Earl M. Maltz, Unenumerated Rights and Originalist Methodology:   A
Comment on the Ninth Amendment, 64 Chi. L.-Kent L. Rev. 981, 982 (1988); Lash, The Lost
History of the Ninth Amendment (II): The Lost Jurisprudence, supra  note x, at [Part II.A].
The Ninth Amendment does  provide support  for our version of a constitution of liberty,
discussed below, in which states  are largely  free to experiment in providing various bundles
of rights, and citizens are free to choose which state to live in.
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Constitution is not exhaustive. This makes perfect sense because rights and
powers are correlative:  if a government does not have the power to impose a
regulation in a particular area, the citizen has a right not to have his conduct in that
area regulated by that government.132 Thus, the Ninth Amendment protects a vast
number of unenumerated rights against the federal government, namely all those
rights that the federal government is not empowered to infringe in the exercise of
its enumerated powers.133 It makes no sense at all, however, to think that the
Fourteenth Amendment would have protected this same vast number of rights
against the state governments, for that would imply that the powers of the state
governments were limited to the powers possessed by the federal government.
Not surprisingly, while the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment
contains suggestions that specific rights included in the first eight amendments
would be “incorporated” and made applicable to the states by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the evidence indicates that this incorporation theory was not
applied to the Ninth Amendment.134
Although the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates” the
Ninth Amendment has no foundation, this does not rule out the possibility that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to protect a right to sodomy quite apart
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135  Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty
(2004).
136  Id . at 333.
137  Id . at 333-34. Barnett adds that the government may restrict the use of its own
property. Id . at 334.
138  See, e.g., id. at 60-68.
139  See supra  notes xx and accompanying text.
140  Barnett says that “the protection of ‘morals’ is the most dubious aspect of the
traditional construction of the police power—although typically this power was used to
prohibit conduct that took place in public places where it could interfere with the use and
enjoyment of public  property by other citizens.” Id . at 334. Unfortunately for this  argument,
governments have a great many powers that they “typically” refrain from using, but which
they do not thereby lose. Moreover, it is not clear at all to us, and certainly not proven by
Barnett, that the power to regulate morals was “typically” reserved to activity in public
places. Drinking, gambling and prostitution, for example, have often been regulated even if
they were done on private premises  and we do not understand by what metric one can
declare  such regulations “atypical.” Indeed, Barnett himself shows that while a few treatise
46
from whatever the Ninth Amendment means. In his recent book, Restoring the
Lost Constitution,135 Professor Barnett attempts to show that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause “puts the burden upon states to justify any interference with
liberty as both necessary and proper.”136 This burden can be met by showing that
an abridgement of liberty is “necessary to protect the rights that everyone
possesses” or to “manage government-controlled public space so as to enable
members of the public to enjoy its use.”137
Barnett’s evidence for this interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause consists primarily of familiar quotations from the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment.138 At no point in his book, however, does he confront or
refute the interpretation of Privileges or Immunities that we discussed earlier and
endorsed: the anti-discrimination interpretation advanced by Justice Field and
defended in detail by David Currie and John Harrison.139 Nor does Barnett’s
defense of Lawrence provide any adequate response to the utter lack of any
evidence supporting the proposition that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
meant to invalidate anti-sodomy statutes, which 32 out of 37 states had on their
books in 1868.140
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writers  in the nineteenth century  wanted to confine the reach of morals  legislation, the Court
upheld regulations designed to safeguard the morals of the community. Barnett, Restoring
the Lost Constitution at 329.  
141  Volokh Conspiracy Weblog, April 26, 2004.
142  We discuss above the reasons that it is difficult to choose an uncontested
definition of the rights of others. See supra  text accompanying notes xx.
143  Barnett, supra  note x, at 41.
144  Rhetorically, at least, there would be considerable tension between demanding
a right of privacy and a “right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
[Constitution].” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
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More recently, Professor Barnett has offered a novel way of identifying
violations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause:
[T]he question of whether someone has or has not violated the
rights of others has traditionally been handled by the private law
categories of property, contracts and torts. Rather than authorize
an independent philosophical inquiry by federal judges, I would
have them generally defer to state law on this issue, as they now
do in diversity cases.141
It is difficult for us to understand how this would work. Deferring to state law in
deciding whether a state law violates the Fourteenth Amendment seems
impossible. And whether one has violated the rights of others has traditionally been
handled by public law, including the criminal law,  as well as by private law.142
We must also dispute Barnett’s positive claim that Lawrence will lead to
a libertarian revolution “[i]f the Court is serious in its ruling.”143 It is true that any
number of revolutions would in some sense be consistent with Lawrence’s empty
and indeterminate rhetoric. And it is also true, as Barnett emphasizes, that
Lawrence substitutes the general word “liberty” for the “right to privacy”
formulation in previous sexual freedom cases. But we do not believe that this
reflects anything more than a taste for grandiosity, or perhaps the Court’s effort to
promote public and private respect for homosexuals and/or for sodomy.144
Moreover, nothing in Lawrence’s use of the term liberty suggests that it
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145  Lawrence at 2475. It is  also true that Justice Kennedy speaks  of liberty “beyond
spatial bounds” and “liberty of the person in its  more spatial and transcendent dimensions.”
As  we have discussed, this hyperinflation of verbiage puffs up the Court’s  opinion without
creating any determinate meaning. It certainly  does  not create a revolution with any
determinate direction.
146 Nor do other recent decisions portend the libertarian revolution favored by
Barnett. It is  true that Justice Kennedy wanted to use due process to s tr ike down one
economic  regulation, namely  the retroactive imposition on certain coal mining companies  of
financial responsibility for coal miners’ health care. Eastern  Enterprises  v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
539 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Apart from the
fact that nobody on the Court  agreed with him, limits on retroactive legis lation are quite
different from the kind of prospective protections that are central to Barnett’s vision of
liberty. It is  also true that the Court  has begun to apply due process analysis to put limits on
punitive damages. See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). But these decisions rest largely on the notion that
disproportionate punitive damages  are so arbitrary  as  not to give fair notice to potential
defendants, Gore 517 U.S. at 574-85; State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519-20. Unlike Lawrence and
similar substantive due process cases, these decisions do not prevent conduct from being
punished, but merely limit the degree of sanction.
147  Cf. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80.
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will be given a meaning beyond the context of sexual autonomy. “Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.”145 Other than matters that are already covered by
express provisions of the Constitution, the list mentions only “intimate conduct,”
which is just another euphemism for sexual conduct. The Court does not refer to
other kinds of liberty, and it certainly does not even suggest any willingness to
protect the economic liberties that are central in classical liberalism. Kennedy’s
failure to ground the opinion in the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges or
Immunities Clause—the textual hooks proffered by Barnett—also suggests that the
Court is far from accepting anything like Barnett’s broadly libertarian views.146
Assuming that the Court does decide to expand the Lawrence approach
outside the area of sexual conduct, we think that this may well lead to a
diminution of liberties that Barnett (and we) think most valuable. Of course, we
do not deny that the vacuous rhetoric of Lawrence could be logically deployed to
protect economic liberties. Take rent control for instance, which certainly infringes
liberty. In American history, state governments have failed to regulate rents even
more often than they have failed to regulate homosexual sodomy.147 And since the
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148 See David  W . Chen, When Rent Control Just Vanishes, N.Y. Times at A-23, June
15, 2003 (discussing elimination of rent control in Massachusetts and relaxation of rent
controls in New York City).
149  Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
150 For a discussion of the effects  of rent control, see Richard Epstein, Rent Control
and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 741(1988).
151 See European Social Charter, Article  11 printed in European Socia l Charter 9
(Council of European Directorate of Information)
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high point of rent regulation during the New Deal and World War II, many
localities have been getting rid of rent control,148 thus suggesting an “emerging
awareness” reflected in “our laws and traditions in the past half century.”149 Rent
control, moreover, is often motivated by hostility to property owners, and its
results are socially pernicious.150 Thus, a libertarian-minded group of Justices could
easily fashion from Lawrence the conclusion that rent control violates due process.
On the other hand, Lawrence could also be used to argue that government
must provide health care to children or even health care to all citizens. It would be
said by many that genuine liberty requires adequate health care, particularly when
children are involved. A libertarian would object that health care is not a part of
liberty because it is a claim against government, not an immunity from government.
But this conception of liberty is contestable. Certainly, Americans throughout
history have not prevented their government from providing health care to children.
And more states are beginning to mandate such care, particularly for children.
More importantly, in the new style of legal reasoning bequeathed by Lawrence,
one could note that many European nations provide for it, and that a right to health
care is enshrined in the social charter of the European Union.151 Why not conclude
that a right to health care can be found among liberty’s “more transcendent
dimensions”?
To be clear, we do not think that the Court is likely to adopt either of these
extensions of Lawrence any time soon, for elite opinion does not strongly favor
a constitutional prohibition against rent control or a constitutional right to health
care. Our point is only that the Lawrence opinion could as logically be used as
precedent for the one as for the other. Thus, if one takes a result oriented
approach, to embrace Lawrence is simply to make a bet on which new rights
elites are likely to embrace in the future.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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153 Conversely, one possible  strategy for getting rid of substantive due process
would be to persuade the Court to adopt a very broad version of substantive due process
that incorporated the principles  of Lochner along with the principles  favored by the
contemporary  Left, in hopes  of provoking a political counterreaction against substantive due
process as such. This will not work. The same Justices  who want to use substantive due
process to expand their power beyond what the Constitution grants  them will easily
recognize that they must deploy the doctrine selectively in order to prevent the creation of
a political coalition willing to take away from them the extraconstitutional power they have
assumed for themselves.
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 Barnett concludes by suggesting that a jurisprudence with a presumption
of liberty ought to grow beyond the sexual arena because “[t]he more liberties the
Court protects, the less ideological it will be and the more widespread political
support it will enjoy.”152 It is true that if the Court used substantive due process to
strike down drug laws, the minimum wage, and large swathes of regulation, it might
seem admirably nonideological to the rather small band of citizens who are
ideological libertarians. But such a series of decisions would merely succeed in
enraging much of the rest of the nation who by their votes in every election suggest
they endorse a very different philosophy of social governance. That might really
start a revolution, but not quite the one that Barnett is hoping for.153
IV.   THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LAWRENCE
The Griswold-Roe-Lawrence line of cases has no apparent basis in the
text or original meaning of the Due Process Clauses, and the Justices have never
tried to show that there is one. But perhaps we should not be so fussy about this
little shortcoming, in light of the practical benefits of substantive due process.
Neither of us will weep for the demise of statutes like those at issue in Lawrence
and Griswold, and a great many intelligent people are genuinely enthusiastic about
the liberating effects of substantive due process as a general matter.
Here we respond to such pragmatic justifications. Even on a strictly
consequentialist analysis, Lawrence’s free-wheeling approach to constitutional law
should be rejected, and it should be rejected even by those who dislike all the
statutes that modern substantive due process has eliminated. This branch of
constitutional law imposes substantial costs on the nation, particularly when the
institutional costs of such a jurisprudence are considered, and it creates few actual
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154  Of course, we do not claim that there were no benefits. The statute challenged
in Griswold, for example, apparently  was  inhibiting the distribution of contraceptives to
impecunious women in Connecticut. See David  J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality:  The Right
to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade 196 (1994). This effect, however, was the result
of political alignments that appear to have been peculiar to that state, and which may have
been quite transient.
155  As for pre-modern cases, Dred Scott clearly  had important effects, and they were
not good. The Lochner-era cases are more difficult to evaluate. We are less inclined to
denounce these decisions on policy grounds than most other commentators  today. Apart
from that issue, however, it is difficult to conclude that the effects of these decisions were
particularly  significant. First, the Court  did  not invalidate very much legislation under
economic substantive due process, and legislatures  were left with a great deal of discretion
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benefits.
It is particularly important to focus on the institutional effects because the
direct costs and benefits in policy terms are very hard to calculate. First, the actual
effects of Supreme Court decisions that invalidate statutes are often indeterminate;
estimating the effects requires the evaluation of difficult counterfactuals, such as
whether the laws would soon have been repealed or left unenforced without the
Court’s intervention. Second, many of the costs and benefits of the rules imposed
by the Court in these cases are still hotly contested as a policy matter, and all of
us should be prepared to acknowledge that our own judgments may not be
infallible. Finally, some of the results reached by substantive due process might
legitimately be achieved through actual constitutional provisions, without incurring
the institutional costs entailed in the undisciplined use of substantive due process.
 For purposes of our argument here, let us resolve the principal doubts in
favor of the Court’s approach, and count as beneficial policy effects all of the
substantive due process norms around which a political consensus seems to have
developed. Even with this generous assumption, and even if we focus narrowly on
the policy effects of modern due process, the net result is not clearly beneficial.
The decisions that have become well-accepted on policy grounds, like Griswold,
appear to have had relatively small benefits: they prevented few actual
infringements of people’s liberty, they invalidated laws that would probably have
soon become a dead letter anyway, and they likely prevented the enactment of
few, if any, new laws.154 In contrast, the decisions that have not been supported
by a strong political consensus, like Roe v. Wade, have had large effects whose
net value is at best open to very serious question.155 
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to effectuate their regulatory  purposes. See Michael J. Phillips, The Lochner Court, Myth and
Reality:  Substantive Due Process from the 1890s to the 1930s 55-58 (2001). Second, the
Court might have reached some  of the results  in these cases  in a more legitimate fashion,
such as  by correctly  interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Finally, given the
economic  competition among the states  in the pre-New Deal era, some of the more
economically pernicious statutes might have succumbed to ordinary political forces.
156  Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
157 It might be thought that our defense of competitive federalism proves too much
unless we are willing to denounce decisions like Brown v. Board  of Education, which
imposed a national rule. Our claim, however, is not that competitive federalism is always the
best mechanism for establishing rights, but only  that it is generally superior to judicial free-
lancing. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted after experience had demonstrated that
competitive federalism did not provide adequate protection for the ex-slaves and their
descendants. More  generally, there  are good theoretical reasons to expect that centrally
enforced antidiscrimination provisions will be needed to protect what Footnote 4 called
“discrete and insular minorities.”  S e e  John O. McGinnis, Decentralizing Constitutional
Provisions v. Judicial Oligarchy, A Reply to Professor Koppelman, — Const. Comm.—
(2003). But that is a pragmatic justification for provisions like the Privileges  and Immunities
Clause of Article IV and its analog in the Fourteenth Amendment, not for substantive due
process.
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The relatively insubstantial nature of the good consequences and the
enduring nature of the much more dubious consequences suggest that there ought
to be a better way of generating new norms of liberty. And there is. The
Constitution itself provides a process—competitive federalism—through which
“[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”156 Apart from the fact (which
we are treating as unimportant for purposes of the present analysis) that this
mechanism actually derives from the text and structure of the Constitution, it is well
designed to capture emerging beneficial norms and to correct the mistakes that are
inevitable in any process of policy development.157 In contrast, centralized acts of
pure judicial discretion, exemplified by the Griswold-Lawrence line of decisions,
will tend to operate in an excessively random manner and will generate mistakes
that are extremely hard to correct.
Under the Constitution’s design, the federal government possesses only
limited powers, leaving to the states most of the responsibility for setting social
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158  See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 485, 508
(2002).
159  See, e.g, Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1045,
1060-66 (1997).
160  See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (free movement); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (free flow of information). It is  not the case
that all, or even most, citizens adversely  affected by a state policy need move, or even be
able  to move, for migration or potential migration to influence a state to rescind (or not adopt)
a policy favored by the majority or by a controlling faction of citizens or legislators. So long
as those migrants willing to move can impose costs  (such as  loss of tax revenues) on the
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offending policy, the state will have incentives to avoid that policy. This is the same
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Data, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321, 323 (1997). Thus, a company may rescind a price increase
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that might otherwise adopt or leave in place laws that impose inefficiently  high costs  on
some citizens.
161 Even poor individuals vote with their feet. See, e.g., Margaret E. Brinig & F.H.
Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. Leg. Stud. 201, 209-210 (1996) (finding that higher
welfare payments  were significantly and positively  correlated with immigration and lower
welfare payments  were significantly and positively correlated with emigration). Moreover,
states that make themselves attractive to low wage workers  will tend to attract businesses
that require  such workers, and those businesses will pay corporate taxes. See Ilya Somin,
Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restrictions of Federal
Subsidies to State Governments, 90 Geo. L. Rev. 461, 469 n.39 (2001).
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policy.158 Representative legislatures throughout the country can make the hard
decisions about the proper line to draw between liberty and license.159 These
legislatures are subjected to considerable market discipline because constitutional
law protects free movement and the free flow of information among the states.160
Individuals can and do take advantage of this freedom,161 and state governments
respond both to changing preferences among their citizens and to the threat of
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emigration.162 As the costs of transportation and information have fallen,
geographic mobility has increased.163 Far from being an eighteenth century
leftover, federalism has become an ever more effective device for promoting the
kind of interjurisdictional competition that can promote the expansion of human
liberty.164
 This argument is not simply abstract or theoretical. The sexual freedom
that has attracted so much solicitude from the Supreme Court has gotten a much
bigger boost from the operation of our federalist system. Individuals who have felt
oppressed by local sexual regulations, not to mention by the social mores that even
the Supreme Court has not yet pretended to dictate, have migrated to more
tolerant jurisdictions like New York and San Francisco.165 There they have
publicized their life style, and used the media to promote the loosening of sexual
inhibitions, which they contend will enhance individual happiness without posing a
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threat to social stability.166 Lawrence (as well as Griswold and the other decisions
whose policy consequences are not particularly controversial) can probably have
only a relatively small accelerating effect on a process of decriminalizing sex
between consenting adults that is taking place independently.167 Indeed, Lawrence
itself seems implicitly to concede this point when it emphasizes that state
legislatures have steadily been repealing their anti-sodomy statutes and that
prosecutions for sodomy are exceedingly rare.168
Compared with substantive due process, moreover, competitive federalism
reduces the risks of error. It does not require judges to determine the right line
between liberty and license through armchair analysis, but instead provides
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feedback information on a range of possible balances as
 states experiment with different social policies.169 Its flexibility permits
incremental change in response to changing social conditions, new information, and
the preferences of citizens. It also reduces the cost of correcting errors by making
it much easier to change direction when appealing new norms prove to have
unforeseen drawbacks. Creating a universal constitutional rule deprives the nation
of the sober second thoughts that competitive federalism permits.
For that reason, claims that Lawrence properly invalidated laws on the
basis of a principle of desuetude overlook this substantial benefit of competitive
federalism as an alternative way of generating new social norms.98 Sometimes
communities fail to enforce laws because of enthusiasms that later fade. For
instance, many cities let their laws against graffiti fall into desuetude, but then began
to enforce them again in response to the broken windows theory of crime
prevention. The people of New York should be especially grateful that the courts
did not employ a desuetude argument to create a right to this particular form of
artistic expression.
The Supreme Court’s failure to recognize that competitive federalism may
bring most of the benefits of substantive due process, without its dangers, is a
natural consequence of judicial hubris. Courts have a comparative advantage in the
analysis of legal texts and precedent. They have no comparative or absolute
advantage in making policy judgments about the proper line between liberty and
license, and our political system already provides better mechanisms for making
those judgments.99 But if the Supreme Court limited itself to protecting this system
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that the Constitution established, there would be one great disadvantage: the
Justices would not get credit for the good results.100
Accordingly, it should be no surprise that some Justices have simply
assumed that the Constitution must include a provision that gives them the
discretionary power to impose their personal visions of justice and what they think
of as the more transcendent dimensions of liberty. This is also the power to burnish
their reputations with the elites with whom they socialize, and who will determine
their historical reputations.101
Unlike federalism, however, this discretion lacks competitive or
democratic discipline. Supreme Court Justices are a much smaller and less
representative groups than state legislatures. They are all lawyers and live in or
near Washington, an artificial city that is in many ways quite isolated from the
major civic and economic enterprises of the nation.102 And, of course, they answer
to no one. It is anything but self-evident that their policy decisions on such matters
as the proper contours of sexual regulation will be systematically better than the
results produced by state legislatures that are disciplined directly by their
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constituents and indirectly by the competitive pressures of federalism.103
There are constitutional theories that take account of this difficulty, and
offer pragmatic justifications for judicial supervision of decisions by state
legislatures. But those theories cannot justify the kind of due process review that
we find in Lawrence. Invalidating legislation on the basis of the original
understanding of the Constitution can be defended on practical grounds because
its provisions were endorsed during ratification by a very substantial proportion of
voters and thus deserve a presumption of beneficence.104 A theory like John Hart
Ely’s takes a different approach, and makes the argument that courts can produce
good effects by correcting systematic defects in the democratic process, such as
tendencies to disregard the interests of discrete and insular minorities and to
entrench incumbent politicians.105 Lawrence-style substantive due process has no
such limiting principle, and there is no apparent reason to expect that its results will
be systematically better than those produced by American democracy.
In this connection, Lawrence’s use of foreign law seems particularly out
of place because foreign decisions may themselves emerge from centralized and
antidemocratic procedures. European traditions are more favorable than American
traditions to the imposition of elite moral views. Indeed, the European notion of
human rights in constitutionalism is fundamentally different from ours:  they are the
product of a search for eternal normative truths to be imposed against
democracy.106 This is quite different from the American conception of rights as
products of democracy, including of course the special democratic processes that
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produce the state and federal constitutions and their amendments.107 Moreover,
the United States has a structure of federalism and more general traditions of
decentralization that are important processes for testing the content of rights. 
Thus, foreign constitutional norms do not just reflect certain views about
the content of substantive rights but also a foreign mode of defining them. Any
judicial opinion from another culture is the culmination of a complex institutional
structure for producing norms. The low cost of accessing the mere words of a
foreign judicial opinion can blind us to the fact that we are only seeing the surface
of a far deeper social structure that is in tension with American institutions. This
does not necessarily mean that the American political system as a whole is better
than that of some others, but it does caution against assuming that judicial decisions
from other nations will produce the same good effects here that they may produce
in a significantly different political system.
 Unlike the policy decisions of state legislatures, the Supreme Court’s
exercise of discretion under substantive due process is also not subject to
competitive pressure. If a decision of the Supreme Court has bad consequences,
its national scope prevents citizens from creating pressure for change by moving
to a jurisdiction that follows a different rule. Moreover, the doctrine of stare decisis
will protect norms from judicial overruling even if they have bad consequences.
Thus, it is very likely that the effects of a free-wheeling jurisprudence like that
exemplified by Lawrence will on balance be harmful:  most of the good effects
would emerge from the democratic process anyway, and the bad effects will be
difficult and costly to eliminate.
 Beyond the direct policy costs of an undisciplined due process
jurisprudence, we think this approach to constitutional law necessarily inflicts
substantial collateral damage on important social institutions. Consider first the
social costs of a Court that creates a common law of substantive due process that
attempts to locate a clear rule of decision in its cases and apply it consistently. It
holds consistently for instance that substantive due process protects all consensual
sex. One difficulty with this approach is that such lawyers’ logic will constantly
bump up against the citizens’ wishes because democratic conclusions are much
less logically coherent and consistent. Citizens may be ready for unrestricted
contraception and private sodomy, but not unrestricted prostitution or bestiality.
The friction with abstract principle will in turn undermine another of democracy’s
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virtues—its ability to represent somewhat discordant views in a process that
permits the slow evolution of social norms rather than the swift overthrow of one
social paradigm by another. The latter kind of change risks the substantial social
costs stemming from political backlashes and the alienation of citizens.
Of course, it is not at all clear from the history of the doctrine that the
Supreme Court is even capable of reasoning in this legally constrained way in
substantive due process cases. In cases of high political salience, like many
decided under this rubric, judges are most in need of guidance from the
Constitution because these are the cases where their raw personal preferences are
most likely to distort the judicial norm of dispassionate analysis. Common law
reasoning, with its dependence on analogy and relatively fluid tools of judgment,
is likely to work least well when passions are high. Thus, the ad hoc due process
approach that has culminated in Lawrence is the more likely alternative to genuine
common law reasoning. Judicial behavior becomes indistinguishable from naked
political judgments: judges reach their decisions by deciding what they think is just
and socially beneficial, what will please the elites who shape their reputations, and
what they guess the nation will tolerate.
This openly discretionary mode of judging has long term costs—costs that
the Justices can impose on future generations with relative impunity. If
constitutional debates about contentious issues of the day become simply politics
by other means, the Constitution will have failed in one of its primary purposes—to
create a framework by which disputes are authoritatively and predictably settled
without simply replicating the strong moral and political disagreements that lead to
the need for such rules in the first place.108 When the Court refuses to resolve such
disputes by resorting to settled legal rules, and instead injects its members’
personal ideological preferences, it sharply reduces the value of this settlement
function. Other politicians, moreover, and occasionally even the people
themselves, will come to recognize that the Court is engaging in ordinary politics
while exempting itself from the mechanisms of political accountability. Once this
extraordinary leverage is widely recognized, it is likely that Justices will be
nominated and confirmed on increasingly narrow ideological grounds, which
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eventually may threaten a general dissolution of the Court’s constitutional function.
The Court’s increasingly casual imposition of elite—and even
foreign—views about the appropriate content of constitutional rights may also have
the cost of alienating the people from their Constitution. If the Supreme Court
doesn’t take the Constitution seriously, why should anybody else? And if the
Constitution is not actually our unifying law, why should the people treat the
constitutional order with more than benign neglect? One important feature of the
American tradition is the bond of affection that citizens have for their founding
document, in some measure because it is theirs.109 Imposing elitist views in general,
and citing international or foreign judicial decisions as justification for doing so,
exacerbates this danger.110 Flaunting a cosmopolitan sensibility may be quite chic,
but this high style comes with a price. The emphatically American nature of our
Constitution has been a source of affection and pride that have contributed to our
social stability.111
Thus, we believe that the Lawrence approach to constitutional law does
not satisfy any reasonable cost-benefit test. Its policy benefits are likely to be small
and short-lived, while its policy costs are likely to be significant and enduring. At
best it is an expression of judicial self-indulgence, and at worst a real threat to core
features of American democracy.
V.   GLUCKSBERG REDUX AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE GRISWOLD-ROE-
LAWRENCE LINE
The final question is what should be done after Lawrence. Without
endorsing any form of substantive due process, we contend that the best
practicable alternative for the Court would be to repudiate the entire Griswold-
Roe-Lawrence line of decisions, and to use Glucksberg as the standard for future
substantive due process cases. In this Part, we begin by defending Glucksberg’s
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test, while acknowledging its imperfections. Second, we explain why embracing
Glucksberg requires the repudiation of Griswold and its progeny. Third, we argue
that stare decisis should not be an obstacle to our proposal.
Our proposal is not likely to be adopted, and certainly not before some
of the current Justices are replaced. Another possible response would be a
constitutional amendment aimed at preventing the most worrisome extensions of
Lawrence. In this Part, we briefly discuss this possibility.
A.   Reviving Glucksberg
Glucksberg is the Court’s most serious modern attempt to reduce
substantive due process to something like law. The requirements that rights
protected by this doctrine be carefully described, and that there be objective
evidence that they are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, reflect
an effort to ensure that the Court is enforcing the kind of genuine social consensus
that is required for provisions that actually make it into the text of the Constitution.
While the enduring consensus that Glucksberg demands is not the same kind of
consensus that produces actual constitutional text, the passage of time provides at
least a rough substitute for that formality. A deeply rooted national tradition is
obviously more than a mere majoritarian preference of this year’s legislature or this
generation’s Supreme Court Justices. The clarity of the test would be further
improved by adopting Justice Scalia’s proposal that the supporting tradition be
found at the most specific level of generality at which a tradition could be
perceived.112
This test addresses our principal practical objections to Lawrence. First,
the test assures that rights protected by substantive due process have long standing
and overwhelming support, and this gives us some reason to believe that the policy
judgments reflected in the decisions will be sounder than those of the occasional
outlier legislature that deviates from a deeply rooted tradition. Second,
Glucksberg’s requirement of objective evidence of a deep tradition should
discipline the Justices’ ideological discretion. Thus, the Glucksberg approach does
not collapse constitutional law into a matter of mere political preference,
undermining the judicial function. Finally, because of its restrictive nature, the test
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still allows a substantial role for competitive federalism to be the primary discovery
mechanism for new rights.  
To be sure, this test for substantive due process does not rescue the
doctrine from all reasonable practical criticism. First, even a strong tradition of
allowing citizens a particular liberty does not necessarily imply that there is a
consensus in favor of creating a rigid constitutional right. Citizens may value certain
traditions, but also believe that they are best enforced through more informal social
and political norms. The process for ratifying and amending the Constitution forces
citizens to choose which traditions they want to enforce as law. Moreover,
understanding that a matter is going to be enshrined as a formal right may well raise
the seriousness of debates on the issue:  citizens will deliberate in a more serious
and reflective manner when they are deciding to place a norm in the
Constitution.113
Second, the scope of traditions is less clear than the scope of language,
particularly when the language is put into a legal document like the Constitution.
While legal terms have cores and fringes that generate hard and easy cases,
traditions are composed of a collection of incidents, omissions, statements, and
silences in a variety of contexts over many years, which makes for greater
ambiguity. And that ambiguity inevitably invests the Justices with significant and
undesirable discretion in identifying the nation’s deeply rooted traditions.
Despite these shortcomings, we think that the Glucksberg approach could
effectively tame substantive due process. The most important line of cases that
would be preserved are the “incorporation” decisions. As we have already
explained, these are among the least problematic expressions of the doctrine
because they involve the application of provisions that are actually in the
constitutional text and because there is some evidence that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was meant to require much of what the “incorporation” doctrine
has achieved. The cases protecting parental rights, from Myers114 to Troxel,115 are
more problematic and more subject to abuse, but this does not appear to be an
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area in which the Court is likely to start swinging for the fences.116
Our defense of Glucksberg, we should stress, does not imply approval
of the doctrine of substantive due process. Nevertheless, we believe that it would
be necessary or proper for the Court to completely repudiate this doctrine, a step
that would entail a wholesale rewriting of constitutional law. As we noted above,
substantive due process is the route by which the Court has incorporated most of
the Bill of Rights. While the route was wrong, we do not think the Court should
engage in a disruptive spring cleaning of a century’s worth of case law only to
reach the same result through a plausible interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.117 Similarly, if the Glucksberg test provides the Court with
little leeway to engage in new judicial adventurism, we do not see a need to
discard it merely to create an immaculate jurisprudence. The case law will never
be perfect when measured against the original meaning of the Constitution, but the
most important reason for overruling past decisions is to rid the Constitution of
precedent that will be the engine of future error.
B.   Repudiating Griswold and Its Progeny
Apart from the Griswold line of cases and the “incorporation” decisions,
not much is left of substantive due process these days, and Glucksberg should not
lead to significant new additions. We do not believe, however, that the Court could
really commit itself to Glucksberg so long as it leaves the Griswold-Lawrence
line of cases in place. These decisions have raised a great many serious and
pressing questions about the scope of the right to sexual liberty. The courts are
going to have to answer those questions, and they cannot use Glucksberg because
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the basic right created by these decisions cannot itself meet the Glucksberg test.
Second, if the Court tries to draw distinctions between these questions and the
questions that have already been answered, it will create patent anomalies like the
anomaly created by Bowers. Thus, for example, the Court might say that a right
to prostitution does not exist because it involves a class of “commercial”
transactions that falls under Carolene Products rather than under the Griswold
line. But who would believe that, any more than anyone believed Bowers’s claim
that the Griswold-Roe line was only about “family, marriage, or procreation”? For
all its other faults, Lawrence was right to recognize the absurdity of insisting on a
constitutional right to abortion while denying a constitutional right to sodomy.
Some might argue that Lawrence did not need to discard the Glucksberg
test because the Griswold-Roe line of cases themselves created a deeply rooted
tradition on which the right to sodomy could rest. We believe that this argument
has three deficiencies. The first is that establishing a tradition through reliance on
Supreme Court cases is bootstrapping. The whole point of rooting substantive due
process in deep traditions is to prevent an unrepresentative and unaccountable
group of Justices from fabricating the rights that are pleasing to them. The problem
is compounded because the “privacy” cases themselves do not provide any
objective evidence of a deeply rooted tradition, but rest instead on bizarre and
facetious constructions of the constitutional text (Griswold) or on a twisted
interpretation of evidence that really showed the absence of a deeply rooted right
(Roe).
Second, this line of cases began only forty years ago, and the abortion
decisions are still subject to the most heated political debate. It seems difficult to
claim that a right to nonprocreative sex has achieved the status of a “tradition
deeply rooted in the nation’s history.” Traditions, of course, can evolve. But if the
Court is to create a constitutional right without the benefit of the formal deliberation
that the constitutional amendment process provides, it should require a stable
consensus over a long period of time—one that has withstood the vicissitudes of
events and ideas that change social attitudes. 
 Third, case law does not work the same way that tradition does. The case
method depends on drawing a principle from a line of cases and showing that it
should logically dictate the result in a different case. Thus, for instance one could
find that constitutionalizing the rights to contraception and abortion have the
common purpose of removing obstacles to nonprocreative sex, which pretty
powerfully implies that one must have a right to nonprocreative sex itself. But
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traditions, like democracy, do not proceed by lawyers’ logic.118 They represent
the accumulation and distillation of intuitions and experience over many
generations, and the wisdom they embody depends in large part on their being
unconstrained by abstract logic.119
C.   Stare Decisis
Finally, the doctrine of stare decisis should present no obstacle to
repudiating the sexual liberation cases. Stare decisis may properly call for retaining
some doctrines based on decisions that were incorrect as an original matter. Stare
decisis, however, is generally justified on two grounds that do not have force here.
First, stare decisis is said to promote stability and predictability in the law.120
Second, adhering to long standing decisions may bolster the legitimacy of the
Court as an institution because it is much harder to believe that the Court is just
applying the law if its interpretation of the law is constantly being revised in
significant ways.121
Adhering to the Griswold-Roe-Lawrence strand of due process advances
neither goal. This line of doctrine creates instability in the law because it lacks any
coherent core that the Court has, or likely will, apply in any predictable or
principled fashion. Thus, we have already seen Lawrence’s outright overruling of
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Bowers, as well as Casey’s modification of Roe122 and its implicit overruling of
some post-Roe decisions.123 Perhaps most important, this line has not only failed
to develop in a consistent way, but it has now culminated in the utter analytical
confusion that is Lawrence, which offers no guidance at all for the future.
Continuing on this pathless journey is the real threat to legal stability.
Nor do we think that anyone could seriously maintain that the Court’s
adventures in the realm of sexual liberty have enhanced its public reputation as an
institution devoted to applying the law rather than making it up. The political
discretion at the heart of the doctrine of substantive due process has created
ripples of institutional instability outside the Court, for it is one of the causes of the
increasingly dysfunctional nature of the judicial confirmation process. Senator
Charles Schumer did not invent out of thin air the notion that judging is really all
about the judge’s “ideology.”124 We wish he could be accused of that, and we
hope that it is not too late for the Court to prove him wrong. But if the Justices
continue on their current odyssey among the “more transcendent dimensions” of
liberty, we fear that they will soon pass the point of no return.
To the argument that asking the Court to abandon substantive due process
is the equivalent of Xerxes ordering the Hellespont to be whipped into submission,
it should be stressed that with Carolene Products the Court did tame substantive
due process to a large extent and for a significant period of time. Of course,
substantive due process will always remain a temptation, but that does not mean
that it impossible to enjoy periodic eras of relative restraint. And these eras are
important because substantive due process has a tendency to become more
internally undisciplined and incoherent as it progresses. If substantive due process
were eventually to return in a more aggressive form sometime after a revival of the
Glucksberg approach, as we suppose it probably would, it could hardly fail to be
more modest and less open-ended than what we find in Lawrence. For this
reason, we think that returning to Glucksberg would at least reduce the risk of a
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126  Remarks by the President (Feb. 24, 2004).
127  David R. Guarino, Same-Sex Marriage Debate; Strategizing Pols Keep Gay Ban
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general dissolution of constitutionalism. 
D.   A Constitutional Amendment on Same-Sex Marriage?
As we have indicated, we do not expect Lawrence itself to trigger any
significant backlash from the public. But now that the Massachusetts judiciary has
taken the most obvious next step by creating a right to same-sex marriage,125
serious consideration is being given to a constitutional amendment that would
address this much more controversial decision. President Bush has endorsed
amending the Constitution to define marriage as “as a union of man and woman as
husband and wife,”126 and even his probable opponent in this year’s election,
Massachusetts’ own John Kerry, has spoken out against same-sex marriage.127
We think it would be a mistake to add a provision to the Constitution
creating a national definition of marriage. Laws affecting marriage vary among the
states and have varied over time, and this is exactly the kind of area in which
competitive federalism provides an effective mechanism for conducting
experiments that may or may not mature into a lasting consensus. The Lawrence
decision, however, does make us suspect that a different kind of constitutional
amendment may be needed. Lawrence’s strong suggestion that mere
governmental disrespect for homosexual behavior is unconstitutional may prefigure
decisions by the Supreme Court declaring that the states must allow same-sex
couples to marry, or that they must at least recognize same-sex marriages
approved by other states. Such decisions would seriously undermine the very
valuable mechanism of competitive federalism. Once such judicial decisions were
made, moreover, they would be especially difficult to undo because of
expectations and vested interests that they would generate. For that reason, we
think that serious consideration should be given to a preemptive constitutional
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art16
128  What we have in mind is something along the following lines:
Sec. 1. Nothing in this  Constitution shall be construed to require any
institution of government in the United States  to recognize  as  marriage, or
grant any benefits  or incidents  of marriage to, any union except that of one
man and one woman.
Sec. 2. No state shall be required by any federal law, or by any provision
of this  Constitution, to recognize the validity of any marriage except a
marriage of one man and one woman.
Sec. 3. Nothing in this  article  shall be construed as  an endorsement of any
prior judicial interpretation of any provision of this Constitution.
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amendment designed to protect competitive federalism from such judicial
mischief.128
CONCLUSION
Many Supreme Court decisions have had worse immediate consequences
than Lawrence. But few decisions in its entire history are so poorly reasoned, and
almost none seeks so overtly to maximize future judicial discretion. Because
Lawrence represents the final dissolution of meaningful legal constraints on
substantive due process, it is likely to generate bad policy results in the future and
it will certainly undermine the Court’s role as an institution that is more than a
reservoir of political discretion for whatever forces can control it. The one possibly
happy consequence is that the transparent emptiness of Lawrence’s analysis will
cause a rethinking of the trends in substantive due process that have estranged the
Court from anything that resembles the rule of law in such cases. Unfortunately, the
better prediction may well be that Lawrence’s style of judicial hubris will prove
contagious, and that other doctrinal areas will succumb to its virulent lawlessness.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
